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ABSTRACT 
Kalaycı, Burcu 
M.A., Department of International Relations  
Supervisor: Ass. Prof. Sean Mc Meekin 
September 2005 
This thesis will analyze the change and continuity in Bulgaria’s foreign 
policy regarding relations with Russia, from the establishment as a principality 
under the suzerainty of Ottoman Empire in 1878, to Bulgaria’s entry into the 
First World War in 1915. After the establishment of the Bulgarian principality 
in the Berlin Treaty of 1878, the focal point in Bulgaria’s foreign policy was 
relations with Russia. In contrast to expectations, Bulgaria did not turn into a 
vassal state of Russia but instead pursued a national policy to create a ‘Greater 
Bulgaria’, the borders of which had been drawn in the Yeşilköy Treaty of 
1878. Russia’s insistence on interference in Bulgarian internal affairs and its 
inconsistent policies further deteriorated relations between the two states. After 
the catastrophic result of the Balkan Wars, Bulgaria even became the enemy of 
Russia by joining the Central Powers in the First World War. Bulgaria’s 
decision in 1915 denoted the failure of Russian diplomacy in Bulgaria.  
 iii  
  
 
 
ÖZET 
Kalaycı, Burcu 
Master Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yar. Doç. Sean Mc Meekin 
Eylül 2005 
Bu tez Bulgaristan’ın 1878 yılında Osmanlı himayesi altında prenslik 
olarak oluşumundan 1915’te Birinci Dünya Savaşı’na girişine kadar Rusya ile 
ilişkileri göz önünde bulundurularak, Bulgar dış politikasındaki değişiklik ve 
devamlılığı inceleyecektir. Berlin Antlaşması’nda Bulgaristan Prensliği’nin 
kurulmasından sonra Bulgaristan için dış politikanın odak noktası Rusya ile 
olan ilişkilerdi. Beklenenin aksine, Bulgaristan Rusya’nın tebaası olmadı, milli 
politikası doğrultusunda Yeşilköy Antlaşması’nda sınırları çizilen Büyük 
Bulgaristan’ı oluşturmaya çalışan bağımsız bir devlet haline geldi. Rusya’nın 
Bulgaristan’ın içişlerine karışması ve tutarsız politikaları iki devlet arasındaki 
ilişkileri daha da kötüleştirdi. Balkan Savaşları’nın yıkıcı sonuçlarından sonra 
Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Bulgaristan Merkez Kuvvetlerin yanında savaşa 
girerek Rusya’nın düşmanı haline bile geldi. Diğer taraftan, Bulgaristan’ın bu 
kararı Bulgaristan’daki Rus diplomasisinin de çöküşü anlamına geliyordu.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The decline of the Ottoman Empire and the accelerating development of 
the Balkan nationalism in the nineteenth century in particular motivated the 
Russians, playing a role the protectors and the benefactor of Slavdom, to take 
side with Balkan nations such as Bulgaria. For the Balkan nations, relations with 
Russia offered the prospect of assistance to gain their independence. 
 Bulgarian nationalism, which developed later than in other Balkan 
nations, basically because of the territorial proximity to the center of the 
Ottoman Empire, was also promoted by Russia. Between 1856 and 1876, some 
five hundred Bulgarian students received Russia’s scholarship for study. The 
underlying reason for Slav brother to back the Bulgaria was that Bulgaria could 
be a potential satellite, an effective base close to the Straits and also an outpost 
for spreading Russian influence. 
  Bulgaria showed a national awakening towards the middle of the 
nineteenth century. The growing economic prosperity of this nation also had an 
effect on development of national awakening among the Bulgarians. The main 
step for the establishment of roots of the Bulgarian national ideology was the 
separation of Bulgarian Orthodox Church from Greek influence. In 1870, with 
Russian support, a Bulgarian exarchate was established and regarded as the 
bridge to the political independence of the Bulgarians. This national church also 
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had the right to extend its influence over any neighboring diocese in which two 
thirds of the people voted for it. It provided significant opportunity for the 
aggrandizement of Bulgarian influence on Macedonia for the next two decades 
in the extent of other Balkan states.  
The small Bulgarian uprisings culminated in April 1876 with a major 
revolt. However the Ottoman government managed to suppress the rebellion. In 
the Istanbul Conference of 1877, Russia tried to solve the problem by peaceful 
means. Especially, Count Ignatiev, the Russian Ambassador in Istanbul, favored 
Bulgarian claims, but the Porte rejected the terms. The failure of the conference 
to obtain concessions from the Ottoman Empire led the Russian intervention. 
After the defeat of the April uprising of 1876 and the unsuccessful attempt to 
resolve the Eastern Question, especially intensifying on the faith of Balkan 
nations in that period, in 1877 Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire to 
expand its influence in the Balkans and defeated the Ottomans. When the 
Ottomans sued for peace, a conference was held in Yeşilköy (San Stefano) in 3 
March 1878. 
The most important result of the Yeşilköy Treaty, sponsored by Russia, 
was the creation of a new tributary Bulgarian Principality under the Ottoman 
Empire, which included most of Macedonia. Russia envisioned a station to 
spread Russian influence in the Balkans. In helping to create the Bulgarian state, 
initially the Russians earned the gratitude of the Bulgarian people. Russia 
counted heavily on Bulgaria, expecting that its influence in that country would 
be accepted and unchallenged. However, this preliminary treaty was revised with 
the insistence of Great Powers who feared Russia’s increasing influence in the 
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Balkans. After the replacement of the Yeşilköy Treaty by the Berlin Treaty after 
six months, the Bulgarians were embittered because the ‘Greater Bulgaria’ was 
partitioned into three pieces.  In the following years the restoration of the 
boundaries established in the Treaty of Yeşilköy became the goal of Bulgarian 
nationalists.  
In this context, the relationship with the Russians was significant for both 
the internal and external affairs of newly established Bulgarian autonomous 
principality. In the beginning, the Russian authorities supervised the organization 
of the new government; Russia played an active role in achieving Bulgarian 
autonomy, but the commitment and gratitude did not lead to subservience and 
dependency. The relations between the Russians and Bulgarians soon grew 
strained because of Russia’s interference to the Bulgarian internal affairs curbing 
establishment of independent Bulgarian policy. 
 For the next two decades, the dynamics of Bulgarian foreign policy were 
based on the realization of national aspirations and in this path; Bulgaria chose to 
sacrifice its liberator for the national ideals. There were of course fluctuations in 
the relationship with Russia: in spite of having smooth relations with the 
personal regime of Ferdinand after 1896, the two sides never became affable 
towards each other.  At the end, when the World War I broke out, the only 
Balkan state, which allied itself with the foes of Russia, was Bulgaria. 
There was a large variety of causes for the rupture of Russo-Bulgarian 
relations: the absolutist ambitions of Prince Alexander von Battenberg, the first 
Prince of Bulgarian principality and his Russophobia; the struggle of the 
Western Great Powers especially Britain and Austria-Hungary, against Russian 
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influence in the Balkans; most importantly the natural development of the 
Bulgarian nation. As relations with Russia deteriorated, the Bulgarians began 
mythologizing their war of independence writing Russia out of the story. The 
inconsistency of Russian policy in Bulgaria allowed the Bulgarians to assert their 
claim to independence.   
 This thesis will analyze Bulgaria’s relations with Russia after its 
establishment as a principality in 1878 to its entry into the First World War as an 
enemy of Russia. My aim is to explain the main components of the gradually 
deteriorating relations between Bulgaria and Russia, and how Bulgaria 
transformed itself from a vassal of Russia into an enemy.  
This thesis consists of three main parts after the introduction. In the first 
chapter, I will discuss the repercussions of the Yeşilköy and Berlin Treaties for 
Bulgaria, the role of Russia in the establishment of Bulgarian principality and the 
inconsistent policies of the Russian ministers. Most important developments 
affecting bilateral relations between the Bulgarians and Russians such as 
unification of the Eastern Rumelia with the Bulgarian principality will be 
examined.  
In the second chapter I will focus on the foreign policy of Prime Minister 
Stefan Stambulov and his Russophobe politics, especially the impact of the 
Macedonian problem, internal conspiracies between the Russophiles and 
Russophobes, the strife between the king and the prince, on Bulgarian relations 
with Russia. Bulgaria’s declaration of independence and the Russia’s mediating 
role in this crisis will also be observed. 
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In the third chapter, Bulgarian road to the Balkan wars and the Russia’s 
aim at the beginning of the twentieth century will be mentioned. The Russo-
Bulgarian relations and Bulgaria’s disappointment to establish ‘Greater Bulgaria’ 
at the end of the wars and the last change to compensate its losses in the First 
World War are the last parts of this thesis.  
The final chapter examines the consequences of the deterioration in 
Russo-Bulgarian relations, as the two nations found themselves on opposite sides 
in World War I. The reality was that Russia had made an incredible mistake in 
Yeşilköy by creating ‘Greater Bulgaria’. For nearly two decades, this newly-
emerged state gradually established its own national identity at the expense of 
Russia’s interests in the Balkans. The Yeşilköy “syndrome” brought two nations 
fighting against each other at the end. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
ROLE OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
BULGARIAN PRINCIPALITY 
1.1.  The Treaty of Yeşilköy and the Dream of ‘Greater Bulgaria’ 
 The 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian war was a matter of crucial importance 
in drawing the borders of the Balkan states and the establishment of Bulgaria in 
particular. The war laid the foundation of the Bulgarian state. It should be 
remembered that, in the course of war, the Bulgarian volunteer force was built 
up with the direct assistance and command of Russia. The activities of the 
Bulgarian voluntary force contributed to both the Bulgarian national movement 
and to Russian victory in this war. 1
 As a result of the capture of Plevna and Edirne by the Russian armies on 
10 December 1877, the Ottoman Empire had no choice other than to make 
peace, so it appealed to the Great Powers. An armistice was signed on January 
                                                 
1 During the war, the Bulgarian volunteers numbered 6,000 men (three brigades). It should also 
be added that the formation of Bulgarian national military force after the war was totally the 
business of Russia despite the hindrance of Russian this sort of activities in the Berlin Treaty. In 
this army, there were thirty infantry battalions, eight batteries, six cavalry squadrons, two 
companies of field engineers and a company of siege artillery, a total of 31.400 troops. Ilia Íliev 
and Momtchil Ionov, “the Influence of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 on Balkan Armies”, 
in Insurrections, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s, Béla K. Király and Gale Stokes eds. 
(New York, 1985), p.363 
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31, and a preliminary peace was agreed upon 3 March 1878.2 In the negotiations, 
Panslavist ideas were prominent among the Russian negotiators and Russia 
ardently pursued this doctrine, in theory, in the interest of Slav people, but, of 
course, its real aim was to expand Russian influence in the Balkans. Russia 
expected Bulgaria to be a subservient state in the diplomatic and political 
atmosphere and on the other side, the Bulgarian people, in turn, saw Russia as a 
protector. 
 The most critical articles of the Treaty of Yeşilköy of 3 March 1878 
were concerned with the creation of an Autonomous Bulgarian Principality, 
including all territories up to the Black Sea in the east, Lake Ohrid in the west, 
the Danube in the South, except northern Dobruca and the Aegean Sea in the 
south expect Salonika and Thrace. These borders were as much as any Bulgarian 
nationalist could ever dream.3 It should be noted that although they would soon 
be revised, the Yeşilköy borders composed the archetypal Bulgarian state and 
from that point, the Bulgarians struggled to reach these lines again.4  Certainly, 
while drawing the borders of the principality, Russian diplomats did not invent it 
arbitrarily. Instead, they took into consideration which territories were inhabited 
by a predominantly Bulgarian population, as laid out in the Istanbul Conference 
in 1876-18775. 
 Count Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatiev, the Russian Ambassador in Istanbul, 
was the organizer of this treaty as the chief Russian negotiator and praised the 
                                                 
2 Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge, 1991), p.173 
3 Richard J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge, 1997),  p.85 
4 This treaty was considered as the liberation of Bulgaria and still celebrated as the national day 
of liberation 
5 A conference of ambassadors met at Istanbul to compel the Porte to issue certain reforms on 
behalf of the Christians. So the Ottomans made an attempt by declaring a liberal constitution 
according to which all subjects were equal before the law regardless of creed. However Russia 
did not satisfy and the mission of the conference fell. 
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treaty as ‘an eloquent expression of Pan-Slav aspirations’6. He was also 
representative of the Russian Near Eastern policy to preserve and reinforce its 
influence among the South Slavs.7 Internal provisions for the government of the 
principality of Bulgaria were also to Ignatiev’s liking.8  
According to the provisions of this treaty, Bulgaria would be given full 
autonomy, governed by an elected prince (with the assent of the powers and to 
be confirmed by the Sultan; the prince should not be a member of the reigning 
house of any great powers), would pay tribute to the Ottoman Empire, have a 
national army, and the countries would be occupied by no more than 50,000 
Russian troops for two years while excluding the Ottoman army in the 
principality.   
Furthermore, a Bulgarian assembly would be formed to work out an 
administrative statute. Other provisions presenting the diminishing role of the 
Ottoman government were the destruction of the Ottoman fortresses on the 
southern bank of the Danube and the disposition of the real property of Muslim 
people who emigrated to the Ottoman territories.9
In this treaty Russia not only granted Bulgaria the most generous possible 
frontiers, but also created most suitable conditions for Russian influence in the 
principality.10 As a result, it seemed that after the treaty the chief controller in the 
Bulgarian Principality was the Russian Empire, it was visible that this area 
would become a Russian satellite, so the establishment of the biggest principality 
                                                 
6 William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 (New York, 1956), p.138 
7 Hristo Hristov, “Retrospect and Analysis of the San Stefano Treaty”, in Insurrection, War, p. 
340 
8 B.H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880 (London, 1962), p. 411 
9 Hristov, “Retrospect”, p.339 
10 Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism- Russian Influence in the Internal 
Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886 (Connecticut, 1978), p.7 
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in the Balkans would no doubt provoke objections of other countries in the 
region. As Valentine Chirol wrote, “Bulgaria, once erected into a fair-sized 
second-class Power, would, it hoped and believed, be wholly devoted to Russian 
interests, and prepare the way for Russian supremacy in the Balkans.”11
Among the territories of the Balkan Peninsula, the region settled by 
Bulgarians was of primary importance for Russia as its geographic proximity to 
the Straits, because one of the main objectives of Russian Balkan policy was the 
control of the Straits which were the ‘the key to Russia’s back door’12.  Russia 
was willing to secure a strong advance post toward the Straits, and it drew 
attention to other Slavs in the Balkans to protect its own position in the Balkans. 
As a great power, Russia showed Panslav sympathies to the Bulgarian people 
and posed a liberator role to maintain its control, prestige and power.  
All in all, the Yeşilköy Treaty would pave the way for Russia’s 
consolidation and preservation of its influence among the Bulgarians through 
Russian army occupation for two years. On the other side, the creation of a 
tributary Bulgarian principality with aspired frontiers would be the first step of 
the political independence in future, the ultimate goal of the Bulgarians. 
However, the contradiction between the Russian and Bulgarian interest would 
bring forward an incredible tension between two nations for the following two 
decades. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Valentine Chirol, “the Attitude of the Great Powers”, in the Balkan Question,  Luigi Villari ed. 
(London, 1905), p.241 
12 Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia, p.3 
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1.2. Establishment of the Bulgarian Principality in the Treaty of 
Berlin and Bulgarian Disappointment   
Considering its conclusions, the Yeşilköy Treaty became the most critical 
one for future of the Balkan states in the nineteenth century. Moreover, the threat 
posed to the European balance of power was the main reason of the 
rearrangement of the Yeşilköy Treaty. It was harmful to the interests of Austria 
and Britain. The latter was concerned about the approximate position of the 
principality under the control of Russia, and thought that it would give a great 
chance to Russia to access the Aegean Sea and also control Istanbul. The 
Romanian, Greek, and Serbian governments also showed their dissatisfaction. 
During the war, the Greeks were forced to remain neutral and at the end of the 
war they received nothing. The Serbs were also dissatisfied about the 
establishment of a Bulgarian principality in their next door.  They were worried 
that Bulgaria would bring Russian power too far into the Balkans. They were 
certain that Russian patronage would be placed exclusively behind Bulgarian 
national aims. Salisbury, the British Foreign Minister, summed up the matter, 
saying he was against Bulgaria since it would increase the Russian influence in 
the Balkans and for him, the new Bulgaria would be a strong Slav state under the 
control and patronage of Russia.13  
In response, Gorchakov, the Foreign Minister of Russia claimed that the 
new Bulgaria did not emerge from the Yeşilköy Treaty, but its germ was 
founded by the Istanbul Conference and these borders were just the mature type 
                                                 
13Charles Jelavich, ibid, p. 7, Arthur May Hyde, A Diplomatic History of Bulgaria 
(Connecticut,1974),  p. 84 
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of it.14 In a note of March 28, 1878, Gorchakov stated that the exclusive aim of 
the temporary administrative measures in Bulgaria ‘is to contribute to national 
development and make possible the convocation of the first Bulgarian assembly 
for finalizing the organization of the principality’.15 However, Russia’s inept 
policy on Bulgaria would indicate that the virtual aim was the aggrandizement of 
Russia’s influence in the region. 
On 6 March 1878, Austria-Hungary proposed a European Congress 
necessary for the reexamination of the treaty. The main aim of Great Powers was 
to avert Russia as a dominant power in the Balkans. In this congress, Otto von 
Bismark put pressure on Russia to submit the Treaty of Yeşilköy to the scrutiny 
of the Powers, and Russia yielded.16 ‘The Yeşilköy Bulgaria’ was opposed 
mainly by Austria and Britain. In the Congress of Berlin, the ethnographic 
uniformity of the Bulgarian people was ignored and Greater Bulgaria dismantled 
into three parts. The biggest part, between the Balkan Mountains and the 
Danube, became a tributary autonomous principality attached to the Ottoman 
Empire. Macedonia and southern Thrace were returned to the Ottoman Empire. 
Thus the Greater Bulgaria, including over 164,000 square km and 4,500,000 
inhabitants, would be shrunk to 64,000 square km and 1,850,000 inhabitants. 17 
The Bulgaria in the Berlin Treaty was just 37.5 percent of the size of Yeşilköy 
Bulgaria. In the south of the Balkan Mountains, the province of Eastern 
                                                 
14 Hyde, pp.84-85 
15 Vladien N. Vinogradov, “The Berlin Congress of 1878 and the History of the Balkans”, in 
Insurrection, Wars, p. 327 
16 Bismark wished to preserve the stability in Europe that enjoyed after the Treaty of Paris in 
1856, since when no Great Power had been allied to another. And in the conference he did not 
support Russia and this produced Russian resentment.  
17 In accordance with the treaty, Serbia and Montenegro were declared independent, Rumania 
became independent too and Dobruca was also given to Rumania but it gave southern Bessarabia 
to Russia. Russia also received Batum, Kars and Ardahan, too.  
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Rumelia18 was established as an autonomous province of Ottoman Empire with a 
Christian governor.19  
The problem of Russian administration in Bulgaria was debated; 
eventually it was decided that the Russian commissary was to be maintained 
only for nine months.20 After the Berlin Treaty, the Russian delegates expressed 
their shock and Gorchakov declared that: “I only regret having had to add my 
signature to such a transaction” and continued “I consider the Berlin Treaty the 
darkest day in my life”. To Aksakov, one of the founders of Panslavist principle, 
the work of the Congress, Bulgarian partition, in particular, was a shameful 
betrayal of the “Slavic cause” for which Russian soldiers had shed their blood. 
He exclaimed, “we are burying today the principles and traditions of our 
forebears, our own wishes; we are burying Russian glory, Russian honor, 
Russian conscience…”21
Though ‘Greater Bulgaria’ was partitioned, the establishment of the first 
national government in the new Bulgarian principality was given to Russia. This 
was as a great opportunity for Russia to intervene in Bulgarian domestic politics; 
in particular, Russian officials were assigned to form the new administration. 
Further, although it was not stated in the treaty, all the Powers recognized 
Russian predominance in the area and thought that Russia would supervise the 
                                                 
18 Beaconsfield insisted that they should not have called this area ‘the south Bulgaria’ but 
‘Eastern Rumelia’, since the Bulgarians in Rumelian region would eventually want the 
unification of north and south parts. Hyde, p. 88 
19 The governor should be nominated by the Sultan every five years, and its capital would be 
Filibe. 
20 The roots of Russian administration went before the outbreak of war; a special commission 
had been set up to deal with the administration of Bulgaria with the head of Vladimir 
Aleksandrovich Cherkassky, the organizer of a civil administration in every district. When he 
died he was succeeded by Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Dondukov-Korsakov. Mercia 
Macdermott, A History of Bulgaria 1393-1885 ( London, 1962), pp. 309-310 
21 Michael Florinsky, Russia, a History and an Interpretation (New York, 1953), v.II, p.1024 
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organization of the autonomous principality.22 The War Minister of Russia, 
Dmitrii A. Miliutin stated his hope and declared that: “…whatever the limits the 
Congress sets on southern Bulgaria, northern Bulgaria will serve as a nucleus for 
the future unification of the entire Bulgarian people”.23 Most European 
statesmen expected that Bulgaria would not be an autonomous state in true 
sense, but a Russian client within the Russian sphere of influence.24
From the Bulgarian side, given these provisions of the Berlin Treaty, it 
was likely to expect Bulgarian disappointment, since the Bulgarians waited for 
the independence and it dispersed the Russian Bulgaria. Ivan Geshov, the future 
Prime Minister said that: 
When the ominous month of July 1878, we in Plovdiv 
read the Times the first published text of the agreement, in which 
a short sighted diplomacy in Berlin partitioned our homeland, we 
were left crushed and thunderstruck. Was such an injustice 
possible? Could such an injustice be reversed?25
This treaty did not satisfy Bulgarian expectations. After news of the 
treaty spread, as the Geshov’s statement shows, that their ideal Bulgaria would 
be broken up, the Bulgarians became furious. They even thought that it would be 
preferable to live in a united administration under the Ottoman rule rather than 
being divided.26  It was a national catastrophe that changed the Yeşilköy Treaty 
from a reality to myth, a rallying point for the nationalists.27
 
                                                 
22 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans (Cambridge, 1990), vol.I, p. 367 
23 David Mackenzie, Imperial Dreams, Harsh Realities, Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-
1917 (Forth Worth, 1994), p.85 
24 Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia, p.28 
25Richard C. Hall, Bulgaria’s Road to the First World War (New York, 1996), pp.3-4 
26 Egon Caesar Conte Corti, Alexander von Battenberg (London, 1954), translated by E. M. 
Hodgson, p.31 
27 Imanuel Geiss, “The Congress of Berlin, 1878: An Assessment of Its Place in History”, in 
Insurrections, Wars, p. 35 
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1.3. Changing Patterns of Relations with Russia: From the Berlin Treaty to 
Eastern Rumelian Crisis (1878-1887) 
1.3.1 Election of Alexander von Battenberg and the Russian Administration 
The Berlin Treaty required an Assembly of Notables (sobranie) was to 
meet under the superintendence of a Russian Imperial Commissioner to form a 
constitution, before the Bulgarian Prince was elected. Prince Alexander 
Mikhailovich Dondukov-Korsakov (1820-93), a skilled commissioner with 
liberal inclinations, became the head of the Russian provisional administration 
between the Berlin Treaty and the election of a Prince.28 He was also the 
innovator in the preparation of the draft constitution.29 The draft constitution was 
sent to St. Petersburg for approval. The problem with him was that he behaved as 
if he was the actual ruler of the principality. For example, he filled all the main 
posts in the Civil Service with the Russians.30
 This constitution, adopted on 10 February 1879 in Turnovo was an 
extremely liberal document.31 It was the creation of both Russian officers and 
Bulgarian liberals.32 Russian Governor, General Prince Dondukov, tried to 
establish a fairly liberal constitution, which provided not only for the necessary 
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ministries, but also for a popularly elected assembly, for the limitation of the 
power of the prince and to serve as a bulwark of the Russian influence.33 Many 
Russian officials and civil servants were appointed. Most importantly, General 
Dmitrievich Parensov became the Bulgarian minister of war and assigned for 
training and organizing a Bulgarian army. Moreover, Alexander Petrovich 
Davydov, the consul-general in Sofia was appointed as the first diplomatic agent 
accredited to the autonomous principality. So, at first glance after the Berlin 
Treaty, Russia was breathing down Bulgaria’s neck all the time.  
During the formation of the constitution, in the Assembly of Notables, 
there were representatives not only from Bulgaria but also Rumelia, Macedonia, 
Thrace and Dobruca.34  It was essential that Bulgaria still did not approve fall of 
‘Greater Bulgaria’ in the Treaty of Berlin by calling the representatives from the 
outside of frontiers of principality. 
After the establishment of the constitution, two parties were formed in 
Bulgaria, one led by Tsankov, Karavelov and Slaveikov on the liberal side, and 
Volkovich, Nacovich, Grecov and Stoilov on the other.35 The conservatives were 
the rich Bulgarians, and they were more educated in foreign policy; they were 
pro-Russian, and they pursued Russian foreign policy. Many of its members had 
been educated in central and western Europe. They believed that the Bulgarians 
were not ready for democratic-self government. On the other hand, Liberals, 
many of whom were educated in Russia and influenced by  nihilist-revolutionary 
ideas,36 were more democratic and represented the Bulgarian bourgeoisie: they 
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were opposed to foreign influence in general and to autocratic Russia in 
particular. Majority of the people sided with the Liberals. Crudely stated, the 
struggle between Conservatives and Liberals or between the Russophiles and 
Russophobes in Bulgaria was one of the disrupting reasons for the next decade 
that not only led the Bulgaria into internal disorder but also created a sound base 
for splitting the Russo-Bulgarian relations. An even more controversial point 
was that the Russian ministers in Bulgaria were not agreed on Bulgarian policy. 
While Parensov was supporting liberals, Davydov was in favor of the 
Conservatives.  
Moreover, the attitudes of the Bulgarian Prince, Alexander von 
Battenberg, led to a conflict between the liberal party and the Russian military 
officials. For instance, Parensov, the Russian minister of war in the first cabinet 
tried to stop Prince’s activities, on the other hand, the agent of Russian foreign 
office, Davydov, adopted a strikingly different attitude; he supported the politics 
of the Prince with respect to changing the constitution and the conservatives37. 
 As Charles Jelavich emphasizes, ‘one of the most glaring weaknesses of 
the Russian handling of the Bulgarian problem was the failure to formulate and 
enforce a single line of action.’38 An important reason for the failure of the 
Russian policy in Bulgaria was that Russian diplomatic and military 
representatives did not follow the same policy and there was no conformity in 
their politics. This caused further tension between the Russians and Bulgarians. 
The Bulgarian statesmen did not want to rule the principality with a liberal 
constitution but the Russians tried to establish a constitutional regime. 
                                                 
37 Charles and Barbara Jelavich, “Russia and Bulgaria, 1879: The letters of A.P. Davydov to 
N.K.Giers” Südost-Forschungen, vol.15 (1956), p.427 
38 Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia, p.279 
 16  
 For example, the Russian minister of war, D.A. Miliutin, was mostly 
effective in the formation. What he believed was that Russia’s position on 
Bulgaria could be best maintained through the inauguration of the constitutional 
regime desired by the Bulgarian political leaders.39 Accordingly, all the Russian 
military officials and the Russian governor-general, A.M. Dondukov-Korsakov, 
backed the liberals and the constitution in Bulgaria.40 Interestingly, Russian 
administration in the principality aimed to establish a modern administration as 
much as possible, and to become an ideal place to live in.41 In other words, the 
reason behind Russia’s back for a liberal constitution was to make the Eastern 
Rumelian Bulgarians more eager to unite with them.42
 Eventually, in April 1879 the assembly, under Russian pressure, elected 
Alexander von Battenberg as the Prince of the Bulgarian principality.43 not being 
a member of the ruling dynasties of any great powers in the Treaty of Berlin, he 
would be an ideal prince for Bulgaria. When he was with the Tsar Alexander II 
(1856-1881) just on the day of becoming the prince, a delegation from Bulgaria 
came to greet him and to show their gratitude to the Tsar. The wording of the 
Tsar to them was meaningful: ‘From my hands receive your Prince, love him as I 
love him.’ 44 Predictably, during the reign of the Tsar, Bulgaria’s relations with 
Russia were relatively cordial, Russian support was given firstly because of the 
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family relationships.45 However, the assassination of Russian Tsar Alexander II 
on 13 March 1881 influenced both the Bulgarian and Russian political 
atmosphere. 
 The election for the assembly was held on October 12 1879, and with the 
result of the election, the majority became liberals, the party of Tsankov and 
Karavelov. After the outcome of the election, he had to nominate a brutal 
Russophile and the head of the liberal party- Dragan Tsankov. However, from 
the beginning, working the liberals was impossible for him. He preferred to form 
Conservative leaders, and he was not in touch with liberal party of all, and he did 
not make any effort to collaborate with the Russians in Sofia. Moreover, having 
trusted on the English support, he dared to object the Russian interest within the 
principality.46
 Beside the troubles of the liberal party in Bulgaria, Battenberg was not 
pleased with Russian officials either. The minister of war was Russian and there 
were many Russian officials in other ministries. Russia wanted Bulgaria to be its 
province. ‘on the one hand, Russia was anxious to control Bulgaria, and Bulgaria 
expected help and counsel from her benefactor.’47 Battenberg at first was 
indebted to Russia for the independence; however, it did not mean that Bulgaria 
did not have a genuine and independent policy. The dilemma between Russia 
and Bulgaria was that the former wanted to control Bulgaria and the latter 
desired to gain full independence. 
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 Battenberg was not pleased with constitutional limits to his power48. He 
believed that the liberal party was not the appropriate party for his views. He 
thought that his people would follow him rather than the liberals. He suspended 
the constitution on May 9, 1881, and tried to amend it. In this, he received help 
from new Russian Tsar Alexander III, who was very conservative and opponent 
of liberalism. Eventually he dismissed the liberal government on May 1881 with 
the help of two Russians; Russian Minister of Bulgaria, General Ehrnroth, and 
Hitrovo, the Russian agent in Bulgaria.49 The Tsar also condemned the liberal 
party in Bulgaria as being revolutionaries and socialists. And the new election 
accepted all  the demands of Alexander III, however all these changes made the 
things worse, as Stavrianos says ‘the basic difficulty was that neither Alexander 
(Battenberg) nor the Conservatives had enough popular backing to rule the 
country without leaning upon Russia. Yet they were not willing to pay the price 
for it.’50 Initially, Battenberg independently rose against the Russian figures in 
Bulgaria. However, after he realized that he could not achieve his goal without 
the support of the Russian Tsar, he relied upon him for support.   
During the reign of Alexander III, with the new Russian ministers in 
Bulgaria, relations between Bulgaria and Russia began to deteriorate. These 
representatives of Russia firstly sought to work with the Conservatives, but the 
Russians and Bulgarians could not work together. The Russians regarded 
Bulgaria as a Russian military outpost and political dependency.51 Moreover, 
Alexander III did not care for Bulgarian nationalism: ‘The Slavs must now serve 
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us not we them.’52 Alexander III thought that Bulgaria was little more than a 
Russian satellite or a province of his own empire.53 Battenberg’s understanding 
was completely different from the Tsar: he thought that as they were both 
sovereign leaders, he could treat him as equal. Needless to say, it was impossible 
to expect harmonious relations between Bulgaria and Russia in this context. 
During his reign, it was difficult to deny Battenberg’s responsibility for 
the deteriorations of relations with Russia.54 But, also the approach of Russian 
administration was also so inconvenient that led to sour the relations. When 
Battenberg came to Bulgaria, he was astonished that he was besieged by the 
Russians wishing to be appointed to significant official posts. Moreover, he 
found himself surrounded by the Russian agents. Intrigues of this sort in 
Bulgaria could also be founded in political life: Russia began to back the party 
that was opposed to the regime of Battenberg after having understood his self-
determining objectives in Bulgaria.55
Moreover, the railway issue created further problems. The Treaty of 
Berlin required the Bulgarian principality to build the Ruse-to-Varna railway by 
the Bulgarian administration. However, as the Bulgarians could not afford to 
construct the railway, by refusing to construct the lines, the liberals therefore 
stalled exploiting some ambiguity about the route which the line was to take.56 
Then, Russia insisted that the Bulgarian government allow them to construct a 
railway from the Danube in the north-east to Sofia or one from Danube across 
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the Balkan Mountains to the Maritsa Valley. However, Bulgarian refusal to the 
Russian proposal of building a railway from Sofia to Danube made the Russian 
side annoyed, since the strategic importance of that railway was so high for 
Russian army which might in future operate in the Balkans. So, here, it can be 
observed that from the beginning, Russian and Bulgarian interests were not 
identical; this sort of matters would gradually build up tension between two 
Slavs.  
About the railways, which were on the agenda for a long time, the Prince 
and the conservatives came into conflict with Russian Generals. In order to get 
rid of Russian generals, Battenberg visited Russia in 1883 to persuade the Tsar 
about the removal of them.57 The Tsar, however, was aware of the real ambition 
of Battenberg in Bulgaria and ‘not only refused to remove the Generals, but even 
began to consider the removal of Alexander himself.’58
During the following years, the troubles between Russian and the 
Bulgarian officials grew. Russia’s continued interference in Bulgarian internal 
policy eventually created strong opposition in 1883. Political parties supported 
the Prince. Likewise, Alexander reestablished the constitution again with the 
object of reconciliation with the liberal party and won the confidence of his 
people in order to form unity in the principality against Russia.59 So three 
different sides of the Bulgarian principality, namely, the prince, the liberals and 
the conservatives had turned against Russia. The whole Bulgaria formed a 
‘national front’ against Russia’s interference in Bulgarian domestic affairs.60 The 
                                                 
57 Macdermott,  p.330 
58 ibid. 
59 Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan, p.183 
60 Stavrianos, p.430 
 21  
humiliated Russians left the principality. Russia’s prestige in Bulgaria was 
gravely undermined. 
 Aftermath of this disobedience, there began intrigues of the Russians to 
change the government and even to form a provincial one. So, the year 1883 was 
a turning point in Russo-Bulgarian relations. Before that year there had been 
disputes between Russophiles and Russophobes on how Bulgaria should react to 
Russian interference, and the Bulgarian policy was not so clear about the 
reaction against Russian officers. However, by 1883 all Bulgaria was against 
Russian domination in the principality, and from this point on, Bulgaria 
gradually began to alienate itself from Russia’s ‘benevolent’ policy towards the 
principality. 
It is crucial to emphasize that the repercussions of two-sided Russian 
policy was not so helpful in Bulgaria. Collapse of Russian policy gave a nation 
to create its self- politics, which owed its autonomy to Russia. While Bulgaria 
tried to establish its own national politics, Russia tried to keep Bulgaria under 
control. Further, the contradictory aims of the Bulgarians and Russians were the 
underlying reason for the deterioration of the relations.  
 
1.3.2. The Unification of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgarian Principality  
The expression of ‘Eastern Rumelia’ was first brought up in the 
discussions between Russia and Bulgaria over the Treaty of Yeşilköy on 3 May 
1878. In accordance with this treaty, Eastern Rumelia was to remain under the 
political and military rule of the Ottoman Sultan while enjoying some 
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administrative autonomy. A Christian governor general was to be nominated by 
the Ottoman government with the assent of the great powers for a term of five 
years. The organization of this province was left under the common 
responsibility of a European commission and the Ottomans, and internal order 
was to be maintained by a local recruited gendarmerie and militia whose officers 
were to be appointed with due regard for local circumstances by the Sultan.61
From the beginning of the war of 1877-78, Russia chiefly displayed its 
aim to save the Slavic provinces from the Ottoman dominance. After the 
establishment of Russian administration in the Bulgarian Principality, there was 
a prevailing supposition in the province, incited by the Russian administrator, 
that one day they would unite with Bulgaria. Ultimately, the administration in 
the Eastern Rumelia in a very short time turned into disorder, and in 1885 the 
uprisings for the unification with Bulgaria broke out. However, at the end of this 
crisis, Russia would be greatly disappointed and Battenberg would gain 
increasing support from the Bulgarian people with his successful victory. 
The Bulgarians in Eastern Rumelia, like the ones in northern Bulgaria, 
not only refused to be under Russian patronage but also desired the integration of 
the other parts of Greater Bulgaria broken into pieces according to the Treaty of 
Berlin. Moreover, Eastern Rumelia Bulgarians were never content to live 
separate from the Bulgaria proper. With the slogan of ‘Bulgaria is for 
Bulgarians’, they tried to send back Turkish immigrant tribes turning their 
homeland after the war by a great harassment.62 In addition to the antagonist 
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attitude of the Bulgarians, one of the reasons why Turkish population could not 
return to their homes was Russian commissioners’ unfair and biased policy 
toward Turks.63
As Charles Jelavich argues: ‘from 1878 to 1885, agitation for 
[unification] was continuous in both Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. To the 
Bulgarians, union was the only rectification of a grave injustice upon their nation 
by the great powers; it is the one issue on which opinion was unanimous 
throughout the century’.64 The Eastern Rumelian Bulgarians, considering the 
establishment of Eastern Rumelia as an artificial division from Bulgaria, were 
waiting for the strengthening of the Bulgarian exarchate. They began to spread 
national provocation and anti-Russian and anti-Ottoman policy in the province. 
Committees were organized and ‘gymnastic societies’ in which the Rumelians 
were educated for revolutionary activities and given weapon-training. With these 
preparations, local Rumelian officials too expected that union was only a matter 
of time.65 The activists also established a committee in Filibe (Plovdiv), the 
capital of Eastern Rumelia, to arrange their activities. This Bulgarian Secret 
Central Revolutionary Committee (BSCRC) was reorganized with the objective 
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of uniting Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. It was also known that these societies 
received weapons and combat training from the Russian army.66
The first uprising began in Otlukköy with the slogan of ‘Damned Eastern 
Rumelia, Long Live Union!’ and the events spread to the Konar. On 18 
September 1885, the rebels arrested governor general Gavril Paşa Krestovich, 
who was known to be in the Russian interest. Gavril Paşa offered no resistance 
and declared ‘I am a Bulgarian and shall not call in the Turks. I wish happiness 
to the Bulgarian people’.67 The rebels formed a provisional government and 
issued a presumptuous manifesto proclaiming the union of Eastern Rumelia with 
the principality of Bulgaria. Moreover, in order to prevent the attack of Ottoman 
Empire, the revolutionary groups sabotaged the railway going to Edirne.  
At the beginning, Russian representatives in the province had encouraged 
the push for Bulgarian unity. Russian officials in the Eastern Rumelia even 
promoted revolutionary activities and even supplied arms for the population.68 
Moreover, some Russian volunteers went to Eastern Rumelia to incite the people 
after the Berlin Treaty. Nevertheless, we should reiterate once again that, the 
Tsar’s personal relations with Prince Alexander von Battenberg of Bulgaria had 
deteriorated steadily since 1883 with the restoration of Turnovo constitution 
again, because the new Prince’s reactions to Russian administration in the 
principality.69  
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After this momentous change, Russia altered its policy towards the 
principality. The Tsar’s new policy was to weaken Bulgaria and eventually end 
Battenberg’s personal regime. Russia thus opposed the union with Bulgaria, 
which was unexpected by the other states. Russia declared its disapproval as 
soon as the rising took place and preferred to be on the side of the Treaty of 
Berlin.  
Having in mind Russia’s policy towards the principality in the context of 
Eastern Rumelia, when the news of uprising immediately spread to Bulgaria, the 
Bulgarians showed their consent with the demonstrations in favor of union. 
Later, the Rumelians suggested to Prince Alexander to come and take up the 
governance of Eastern Rumelia.70 Battenberg was in Varna at this time and 
received the following telegram: 
To His Highness Prince Alexander! 
The entire population of the South Bulgaria has today proclaimed 
in all towns and villages the Union with North Bulgaria, with 
Your Highness as Prince. The South Bulgarian army has taken the 
oath of loyalty to Your Highness and occupied the Turkish 
frontier. It is waiting impatiently to see its new Chief in its midst 
and to receive his orders. Major Nikolajev, Commander in Chief 
of all South Bulgarian Troops.71
Without doubt, receiving this message was one of the most difficult times 
of Battenberg in his life. He faced a choice of accepting the union or being 
abdicated by the Russians. At first, he was not sure whether to back the fait 
accompli or not. From another perspective, Macdermott claims Battenberg was 
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fully aware of what was going on, although to avoid international complication, 
he pretended to know nothing.72 What was the virtual concern of Battenberg was 
that in the previous month he had met with, N. K.Giers, the Russian foreign 
minister, and had given his assurances that he would not promote unification. 
The union was also in violation of the Treaty of Berlin and could not be 
accomplished without great powers’ approval. Russian opposition could be 
accepted. Nevertheless the Prince was fully aware that, unless he retained the 
leadership of the Bulgarian national movement, he would lose his throne. 
Moreover, the Bulgarian people were in favor of unification. He therefore 
accepted the situation and gave his full support to the union.73
From the Russian side, the impact of the news was met by great anger in 
St. Petersburg. The Tsar at once forbade all Russian officers serving in Bulgaria 
to participate in the movement. He then summoned all Russian officers to return 
from Bulgarian army. Finally he declared that the union was illegal and this 
action was undertaken without his consultation.74 The Tsar reaffirmed his 
support for the Treaty of Berlin, and promised to preserve the Sultan’s sovereign 
rights.75 Amazingly, Russia also offered support if the Ottoman Empire decided 
to occupy Eastern Rumelia, they could take action together against Bulgaria.76 It 
was interesting that after seven years Russia now sided with the Berlin Treaty 
from which it was a few years ago severely damaged and switched the other 
side. Russia now supported the use of Ottoman military force against Bulgaria. 
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The Tsar sent a telegram to the prince saying that: “Russia has made so many 
sacrifices for Bulgaria that she has the right to expect the Bulgarian people to ask 
St. Petersburg for advice before making such important decisions.”77
In this context, Russia’s position entirely changed. Now, St. Petersburg 
had lost the control of the Bulgarians, it no longer wanted them to be strong. It is 
possible to assert that for Russia, Yeşilköy was a mistake in the sense that it now 
created a nation opposed to its Pan-Slavic policy. Bulgaria in contrast now began 
to establish ‘Yeşilköy Bulgaria’ while breaking the relations with Russia. 
On this occasion, Battenberg could not expect Russian support. A 
Bulgarian delegation, headed by Metropolitan Kliment of Turnovo and the 
representative of the assembly and Eastern Rumelia went to Copenhagen to 
speak with the Tsar and Giers78, but the Russian decisiveness was also visible 
from what the Tsar told Bulgarian delegation: “There can be no question 
whatever of dissolving the union, but as long as you keep your present 
government, expect from me nothing, nothing, nothing!”79  
So Russia refused support for Bulgarian union with Eastern Rumelia. 
Russia could not approve the means the Bulgarians appealed simply because it 
was against his majesty.80 Indeed, the Tsar was opposed to the unification for 
fear that the Bulgarian Prince would get closer to the English government, the 
signatory power in the Berlin Treaty and in that way Russia would lose 
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influence.81 The British government was beginning to view Bulgarian 
nationalism as a valuable way to hinder the Russia’s domination of the Eastern 
Balkans. The Bulgarians also knew that Russia was not happy with this way of 
annexing Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria. Russia was in favor of a direct military 
interference by the signatory powers of the Berlin Treaty. But Bulgaria refused 
and did not allow any Russian intervention.82
The Great Powers’ ambassadors met in Istanbul to discuss the crisis, but 
the conference could not reach a decision. Serbia (with Austrian backing) 
declared war against Bulgaria to prevent Eastern Rumelian union, which would 
change the balance between Balkan states. Serbia was also concerned that the 
irredentist spirit of Bulgaria could spread to Macedonia as well. Even though, the 
Bulgarian forces had no senior officers to organize them and no organized 
commissariat to feed them or their animals, Battenberg’s army with Rumelian 
revolutionary forces won the two-day battle in Slivnitsa with an excellent 
defense with his young officers who had replaced after Russian official 
withdrawal.83  
Battenberg’s successful campaign was important in the history of 
Bulgaria because it made it impossible to preserve the status quo, as he desired 
above all.  The Prince became at once a national hero with his national army, got 
rid of Russian officers; and the Russian press, which was never allowed to depart 
far from the views of the autocracy, was full of praise for the Prince and for the 
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Bulgarian army, which had been of course a Russian creation.84 Yet, it 
demonstrated more inconsistency in Russia’s policy towards Bulgaria; there was 
a simultaneous Slavic pride and Pan-Slavism erupted again in Russia. This was 
merely an echo of the Yeşilköy Treaty. The problem with Russia’s policy was 
that it was prone to this kind of romanticism.  
The striking point in the Bulgaria’s relations with Russia considering the 
Serbia-Bulgarian war was that Bulgaria determinedly displayed that it had both 
the potential and the capability to take action independently. Likewise, the 
absence of the Russian officers was the indication that this victory was a national 
one and free from Russian help. 
 After the war, the conference was held in Istanbul and the Agreement of 
Tophane was signed on April 5, 1886.85 This unexpected victory had a favorable 
effect on Bulgaria’s international standing, and therefore on the ultimate course 
of the Istanbul Conference. This victory of the Bulgarian army not only changed 
the color of the Eastern Rumelian Crisis but also attitude of Battenberg towards 
the Ottoman Empire.86  
According to the treaty, the union was supposed to be only a personal 
one. Alexander Battenberg was Prince of Bulgaria and governor general of 
Eastern Rumelia. Throughout the negotiations, the Russian government objected 
to the first article of the treaty, which mentioned ‘Alexander’ by name as the 
governor of Eastern Rumelia. In other words, the ‘Bulgarian Prince’, and not 
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‘Battenberg’ personally, was named as the Governor-General. It was another 
opportunity for the Tsar to show his persistent to disapprove of his cousin.87 The 
deletion of his name would make it possible for Russia to secure his removal 
either as prince of Bulgaria or as governor of Eastern Rumelia, and thus break 
the union.  
Moreover, this arrangement was considered a betrayal against Russia and 
Orthodoxy.  According to the article 4of the Tophane Treaty, in case of a war 
between Russia and Ottoman Empire, the Bulgarians would take side with 
Ottoman Empire. So, under Russian pressure, the Sublime Porte had to remove 
this article when submitting it to Istanbul Conference. The military agreement 
between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria was not to be permitted.88  
The Prince had assumed the leadership of the movement for the 
unification. But he had failed to persuade the great powers to establish a uniform 
administration for the two provinces. He objected strongly to the change in the 
terms made with Ottoman Empire.89 ‘I cannot and will not’ he said, ‘lend a hand 
to the reestablishment of international sovereignty on Eastern Rumelia which 
was the principal cause of the government without strength, without authority, 
not respected, and consequently even injurious to the interests of the people.’90 
However, at the end, because of ‘lacking enough great power support, first the 
Ottoman Empire and then Bulgaria were forced to accept these modifications’.91
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Understandably, after the unification, the victory and subsequent increase 
in Bulgarian nationalism made the relations between Russia and Bulgaria worse. 
Bulgaria was taken seriously in the international arena. Russia’s departure and 
the war with Serbia had a great effect on the development of the national 
sentiment of the Bulgarian people.92 The unification both enlarged the territory 
of the Bulgaria and also it increased its political importance in the Balkan 
Peninsula. From now on, the Tsar realized that unless relations improved 
between Bulgaria and Russia, the obdurate prince should be overthrown 
immediately. For Russia, the unification, originally had been supported by it 
before, increased the credit of Bulgarian Prince instead of the Russians within 
the principality.  
 
1.3.3. The Abdication of Prince Alexander von Battenberg and the Election 
of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg 
Predictably, after the unification of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria, 
Russian agents in Bulgaria tied to incite the Bulgarians saying that ‘You shall 
never have the effective union of your country as long as Battenberg remains on 
the throne!93 Even, some thought that ‘the ultimate result of this crisis would be 
either with Prince A. Battenberg against Russia or with Russia without Prince A. 
Battenberg’94. In other words, nothing less than Battenberg’s abdication would 
satisfy the conspirators.  
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 Russia showed a great animosity against the Prince and warned that 
Battenberg should not be named the new governor of Eastern Rumelia. In the 
light of this development, after the unification, the future of Battenberg seemed 
desperate, as Russia perceived him as the main obstacle to reestablish his policy 
in Bulgaria. The Russian agents in the principality argued that the nation could 
achieve nothing without Russian support, and that Battenberg’s hostile policy 
towards Russia was an obstacle against Russia’s help to the Bulgarians.  
 Inevitably, Russian agents supported the organization of a coup against 
Battenberg.95 On 20 August 1886, Battenberg was kidnapped in his palace. It 
was said that the Tsar ordered him to abdicate for the future of Bulgaria.  After 
the abdication, Zinoviev, the head of the Asiatic Department and thus of 
Bulgarian affairs, described the prince as the “ulcer that had been grafted” on 
Bulgaria. In his view, the Bulgarians were still children who needed firm 
Russian guidance.96 However, abdication would not be a permanent solution for 
Russia as the Bulgarian leadership continued to their policy of rigid resistance to 
the Russian control.  
After Battenberg’s abdication, a provisional administration was 
established under Metropolitan Clement, the Russophile church leader. 
However, the public did not support him. As it was stated above, there was a 
Russian and Bulgarian quarrel in the principality, the Tsar of Russia would not 
allow Battenberg’s return. It was a period of interregnum and the principality 
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was governed by the regency. So Stefan Stambulov, the rising figure in the next 
decade of the Bulgarian history, organized a counterrevolution and persuaded 
Battenberg to return to Bulgaria. 
However it was not the end of Battenberg’s troubles. Assuming the 
Russia’s help in his return, Battenberg sought to reconcile with Russia and sent 
an interesting telegraph, as a golden bridge between two states97, to the Tsar 
saying: ‘Russia gave me my crown: I am ready to return it into the hands of her 
sovereign.’98  However the Tsar replied: “I cannot approve your return to 
Bulgaria foreseeing disastrous consequences to country already so severely 
tried….Your Highness will judge what is your proper course”.99
The Tsar’s unyielding stance made clear that Alexander had to leave 
Bulgaria, in spite of the insistence of Stambulov. As Stavrianos claims 
“Alexander succumbed to the weight of Russian pressure.”100 Still, Battenberg’s 
abdication would not restore Russia’s influence in the region, as the new 
government maintained its independent attitude. 
After Alexander’s departure, Russia tried to strengthen its supremacy in 
the principality. The Tsar sent General Nicholas Kaulbars,101 as a commissioner 
to elect a new prince. Kaulbars firstly wanted all arrested conspirators who 
organized the coup to be released.102 In addition to this, he thought that the desire 
of the Bulgarians was to be protected under the Russian Empire, so every 
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opportunity he attempted to express his feelings and could not grasp the anti-
Russian attitudes of the society.103
Predictably, Stambulov resisted Kaulbars’ presence in the principality. 
General Assembly held the elections on 10 October 1986 without consent of 
Kaulbars. ‘He frustrated the conspiracy of General Kaulbars, and quelled a 
military conspiracy that had been originated by Russia at Silistria and Rustchuk, 
thus protected the elections.’104 Without any doubt, this action of Bulgaria was a 
strong resistance against Russia by declaring that they were self-sufficient and 
they could stand on their feet.  
Kaulbars, with his authoritative nature, irritated the Bulgarians and 
increased Russophobe feeling in the principality. Stambulov’s party won a large 
majority in the elections. Being unsuccessful, Kaulbars terminated all diplomatic 
relations and left Bulgaria with all Russian consuls and agents: in this way, 
Russia broke its diplomatic relations with its former protégé.105 Russia, poking 
its nose into Bulgaria’s internal affairs, had again failed. From the beginning of 
the establishment of the principality, Russian Balkan policy was plagued by 
inconsistency in Bulgaria and Russia’s blundering brought a strong reaction in to 
foreign intervention, weakening Russian influence in the principality.  
More turmoil was to come. As Prince, the Bulgarian assembly elected 
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg,106 (1861-1948) without the approval of the Russian 
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Tsar. In accordance with the Treaty of Berlin, the election of Prince of Bulgaria 
by the assembly had then to be confirmed by the great powers. Thus, Russia did 
not accept Ferdinand as the new prince, claiming the election was illegal. 
Russian claim seemed reasonable. However, as regards Bulgaria’s new stance, 
Sofia would not hesitate to take action without Russia’s consent. The essence of 
the Bulgarian policy was to establish their self-national policy. For sure, in the 
new election, Russia’s approval would change nothing. 
 Russia’s objection was to the Assembly which had acted illegally, 
namely, without its consent. Besides, Russia had been offended by the Bulgarian 
nationalists’ attitudes towards the Russian General Kaulbars. So it would likely 
recognize any decision taken by assembly.  Further, as Russia refused, the other 
great powers, for fear of offending the Tsar, refused to recognize the new prince.  
Relations between Bulgaria and Russia now worsened further. 
In conclusion, there were a number of reasons for the deterioration of 
Bulgaria’s relations with Russia between 1878-1887; compounding the Tsar’s 
mistrust was the autocratic and brutal policy of the Russian officials in Bulgaria. 
On the other side, Bulgarian national awakening and the desire for a self-
governing state was the Bulgarian priorities in their relations with Russia. 
Unsurprisingly, Russia did not want to accept the Bulgarian people’s will to gain 
national independence or freedom, and Bulgaria could not endure gross 
interference in their domestic affairs. To sum up, Russia did not have a 
harmonious policy towards the Bulgarians and Bulgaria had a great desire for 
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national unification to realize ‘Greater Bulgaria’, these two main conditions led 
the alienation of two states towards each other. 
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    CHAPTER TWO: 
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
2.1. Prime Minister Stefan Stambulov’s Regime: The Macedonian Question 
and the Rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire  
             After Ferdinand’s election, Stefan Stambulov became the Prime Minister 
of Bulgaria between the years 1886 and 1894. He strongly pursued an anti-
Russian and pro-Ottoman policy.107 His overriding character was stubbornness 
he unwaveringly refused to work with Russian agents striving for the fall of 
Ferdinand. This gained him Russia’s hostility. Under Stambulov’s regime, 
Russia had no representation at Sofia.108 Another important figure of his term 
was the considerable development in the Bulgarian army; he restructured and 
renovated the army in 1888 and the size of the armed forces’ size increased by 
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50 percent.109 His regime was also known as being rigid and he was said to have 
ruled Bulgaria with an iron hand.110   
              During Stambulov’s period, the Macedonian question was always on the 
agenda in foreign policy. To reiterate, in the Yeşilköy Treaty, the Bulgarian 
principality was composed of the prominent part of the Macedonian lands, 
however, with the opposition of England and Austria, this treaty was reorganized 
with the Berlin Treaty and Macedonia had been returned to Ottoman Empire. It 
was certain that Bulgaria was still great desired to realize the boundaries of 
Yeşilköy, which included the Macedonian lands.111
In 1870, a ferman had been issued to establish a Bulgarian Exarchate in 
the areas including Plovdiv, Varna and the lands to Danube.112 More 
importantly, this exarchate could extend its jurisdiction over the areas outside of 
Bulgaria proper upon the vote of two-thirds of the inhabitants. 113 So, this created 
the origins of not only Bulgaria’s Macedonian ambitions but also the origins of 
the friction between the Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians. At the same time, the 
Ottoman’s declining authority was prevailing still in the region and Macedonians 
realized that as long as this system continued, they had no future. Many 
revolutionary movements were established with the slogan of ‘Macedonia for 
Macedonians’. The IMRO, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, in 
particular caused turmoil by their terrorist activities, especially in the beginning 
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of the 20th century. After its failure in the Ilinden uprising, IMRO was severely 
affected by the outcome of the uprising and the ensuing reprisal. Later, it drifted 
under the influence of Macedonian Supreme Committee, following a pro-
Bulgarian policy. 114
Macedonia as a meeting place of all ethnic groups in the Balkans was an 
area of indefinite boundaries. From Salonika on the Aegean Sea, it followed the 
Valley of Vardar River northward to Üsküp, westward to the Lake Ohrid on the 
Albanian frontier, and eastward to Strumitza region on the Bulgarian border. Its 
territory was the bone of contention locating between Serbia, Greece and 
Bulgaria, as these three states imputed their so-called rights on the area to 
historical and ethnic concerns. This question was the matter of conflict after the 
revision of the Yeşilköy Treaty. The Serbs was especially active in region 
around Üsküp, which was also wanted by the Bulgarians, as had been promised 
them in the Yeşilköy Treaty. Greece had designs on Vardar Valley, hoping to 
receive southern Macedonia as a hinterland for a littoral on the Aegean by the 
Greeks. Both Greece and Serbia favored partition of Macedonia, but Bulgaria 
was willing an autonomous Macedonia under nominal Ottoman patronage until 
the time when it could be annexed by them.  
What did Stambulov think about Macedonia? He pursued a patient and 
modest policy. He believed that disorder in Macedonia would give Russia a 
chance to intervene in the fight between Slav brothers in Balkans. So, he tried to 
show sympathy to the Ottoman Empire. His Macedonian policy was to 
‘Bulgarianize’ it gradually and expertly while it was under the rule of Ottoman 
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Empire.115 Stambulov’s amicable relations with the Ottoman Empire was 
allowed him to establish of two additional Bulgarian bishops in Macedonia, and 
to organize a large number of Bulgarian schools in different parts of the Ottoman 
Empire where the number of Bulgarians consisted of majority.116 He believed 
that a revolution in Macedonia could give Russia an opportunity to interfere with 
no disinterested motive; so he was so eager to establish peaceful relations with 
Ottoman Empire which would sooner or later allow Bulgaria influence in 
Macedonia to grow.117
The Macedonian policy of Stambulov, in spite of its benefit to the 
Bulgarian problem, was attacked by not only by the Russophiles but also the 
Macedonians living in Bulgaria, who sincerely thought that the salvation of 
Macedonia could only be achieved by the aid of Russia. So they agitated for a 
government pursuing Russia’s interests.118 This contradiction would elevate the 
tension against Stambulovist Russophobe policy in Bulgaria.  
The next question was what Russia thought about Macedonian problem. 
On the initial question on the partition of Macedonia, Russia backed Bulgarian 
claims, saying Bulgarian population constituted the majority in Macedonia. 
However, in 1890s, due to the deterioration of the bilateral relations between two 
states, Russia’s policy reciprocally altered for not allowing the dominance over 
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Macedonia and opposed the Bulgarian gains any more.119 Even if the relations 
between the small state and the great power were reconciled in 1896 with the 
efforts of Ferdinand, it would no longer be the same as in 1878. 
 For Stambulov, the Ottoman Empire was seen as an enemy against 
Russia120. On the other side, regarding the friendly relations between Sofia and 
Istanbul, he even favored a personal union with the Ottoman Empire by which 
the Ottomans would become the masters of Bulgaria and a dual Ottoman-
Bulgarian empire would be formed to resist the Russian encroachments; a 
similar idea was also explored in regard to Romania121. While Bulgaria was 
approaching to the Ottoman Empire on the other side, the bonds with Russia 
were loosening. In 1886 Russia even declared all relations with Bulgaria severed 
and withdrew to what it hoped would be a more successful policy of boycott and 
isolation.122
It should also be added that during the time of Stambulov, Bulgaria had 
no real friend in the Balkans. This antagonist policy of him towards Russia was 
not so painless for Bulgaria, because no other power could be counted on 
assistance.123 The change in the Serbian government in 1887 in favor of Russia, 
and the Macedonian dispute with Greece gave incentive for Stambulov to 
improve the relations with the Ottomans. Stambulov knew the Bulgarian army 
was not ready to take a unilateral action to save Macedonia. So, the safest way to 
win Macedonia was to receive an external contribution. He believed that neither 
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a Balkan alliance nor Russia’s help would fit the Bulgarian aim to save 
Macedonia because they could lead to the partition of the region. Thus, securing 
Macedonia should be realized by patiently building up Bulgarian cultural 
dominance under the Ottoman political power. 
             In the second half of 1887, Russia commenced a diplomatic campaign 
against Bulgaria. St. Petersburg insisted that the Ottomans, still the suzerains of 
the Bulgarian Principality, should intervene immediately in Bulgaria by sending 
troops to remove Ferdinand and Stambulov and thus Russia would establish its 
own new regime under the head of General Ehrenroth.124 Without doubt, this 
suggestion was refused by the Sultan, who feared causing an international crisis. 
Considering the serious rupture of the relations between Russia and Bulgaria, the 
former, complaining the naughty son to his legal father, now straightforwardly 
began to protest the latter. In opposition to the Russia’s exhausting policy, 
Ferdinand in every opportunity declared his loyalty to the Sultan to save his 
crown.   
           Towards the end of 1887, a number of Russians, led by Nabokov, who 
had been convicted previously of similar incitement, now tried to wake up a 
local rising in Burgaz and from this center wanted to unite the nation against the 
Prince and the Premier.125 But they failed, as the people were not so concerned 
with them. Nabokov’s movement was rapidly crushed by killing the leader and 
many followers of him. It was also known that the Russian legation at Bucharest 
was encouraging this group and other protesting the Bulgarians in the 
principality. After failing in these sorts of plots, in 1888, from this time on, 
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Russian policy toward Bulgaria changed to one of declaring noninterference to 
the Bulgarian internal affairs. Nevertheless, St. Petersburg tried to convince the 
Bulgarian government that without Russian help, the internal tranquility would 
not be settled.  
             However, the Panitsa affair would reveal that Russian collaboration with 
the Russophiles in Bulgaria to dethrone Ferdinand and establish a new regime 
under Russian influence was clandestinely still alive. Major Kosta Panitsa126, one 
of the most popular officers of Macedonian origin in the army, thought that there 
could be no hope for liberation of Macedonia without Russian cooperation, and 
there could be no hope of Russian cooperation as long as Ferdinand remained in 
Bulgaria. He resolved to assassinate the prince.127 According to Svoboda, he was 
in touch with Russian agents in Bucharest and other Russian diplomats as early 
as 1887.128 However, the day before their conspiracy, he and his collaborator, a 
Russian merchant, were arrested. In Panitsa’s house, diplomatic dispatches to 
and from Bucharest, showing Russian complicity in the plot through the 
Bucharest diplomatic office and even involved I.A. Zinoviev, head of the Asiatic 
department of the Russian foreign office, were confiscated.129 Stambulov 
regarded the Panitsa plot as the most serious of all the threats he and Ferdinand 
had so far faced. After the trial, Panitsa was executed in front of the assembled 
Sofia garrison.130 Russia’s reaction to this affair was sensitive; the Russian press 
called Stambulov as murderer. ‘The shooting of Panitsa was indeed a test for the 
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new Bulgarian regime, a test that was passed with conspicuous success. Once 
more the Russians had staked their money and had lost.’131  
             In 1889, Bulgaria’s relations with Russia entered a new phase. The 
abdication of King Milan in Serbia and the new regencies’ Russophile attitudes 
gave a chance to Russia for forming a new protectorate in the Balkans. With a 
new ally in Serbia, Russia did not need to search a prompt way to consolidate the 
relations with Bulgaria. Moreover, after this political change in Serbia, Russia 
began to assist the growing propaganda campaign of Serbia in northern 
Macedonia.132   
On the other side, due to having smooth relations with Ottoman Empire, 
in 1890, Stambulov requested both the recognition of the prince and also 
concessions for Macedonia to withstand Russian boycott and hostility. However, 
because of Russia’s insistence, Ottoman Empire did not recognize the prince but 
accepted to send a representative to Sofia to supervise the vakfs and also berats 
were promised for the Üsküp, Ohrid and Manastır dioceses. Further, the exarch 
had received the right to get into contact with the Bulgarians Edirne and also 
publish a newspaper in Istanbul under certain conditions.133 In 1894, Stambulov 
acquired for Bulgaria two more exarchist bishoprics in Macedonia, Veles and 
Nevrokop. This was a great success of Stambulov and also Prince Ferdinand as 
now it was an effective demonstration that the principality could exist in spite of 
not only lack of Russian aid but also severe Russian hostility. It was also an 
outstanding occasion for the Bulgarians observing the consolidation of the newly 
emerged regime through the ideal of ‘Yeşilköy Bulgaria’.  However, the 
                                                 
131 Hans Roger Madol, Ferdinand of Bulgaria, the Dream of Byzantium (London, 1933), p.55 
132 Crampton, Bulgaria, p.135 
133 Crampton, Bulgaria, p.138 
 45  
Macedonian lobby would never satisfied with these reforms and always insisted 
on Stambulov to take more direct and stern action.  Stambulov, in order to win 
the recognition of Prince Ferdinand as the lawful prince of Bulgaria, preferred to 
take softer actions and strengthen the religious and educational work of 
exarchate, rather that to support the schemes of revolutionaries. 
 Stambulov also got into conflict with the assembly about the declaration 
of independence problem; he thought that if Bulgaria proclaimed its 
independence, in the international arena, it could be accused of jeopardizing the 
peace as reviving the Eastern question.134 So he supported the maintenance of 
Ottoman suzerainty, thus in case of any power declared war on Bulgaria, 
Bulgaria would not remain alone, because it would also be Ottoman and also the 
European powers’ concern.135  
Stambulov’s time was full of intrigues and conspiracies.136 To save the 
country, he harshly punished the brigands, who were mostly both Panslavists in 
the service of Russia and also Macedonian revolutionary bands. However, his 
rigid regime brought forth his enemies, which grew in number day by day. From 
the beginning there were battle against Stambulov, but being disorganized, the 
opposing side achieved nothing. The more Stambulov employed authoritarian 
means, the more his reputation suffered. Due to his rigid Russophobe policy, 
Panslavists in and outside Russia began to attack the minister. Their aim was to 
terrify the Prince into subservience to Russia. Even if he stood firm against his 
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political opponents, about whom he thought as Russian puppets, his efforts to 
save Bulgaria nearly brought his end. In March 1891, an assassination attempt 
against Stambulov failed, because the assassins confused Stambulov with the 
Minister of Finance M. Belchev, walking back home after a dinner, and they 
killed Belchev, who resembled Stambulov in appearance.  
Furthermore, after Belchev’s assassination, in 1892, Stambulov’s close 
friend and adviser Georgi Vŭlkovich, the Bulgarian diplomatic agent in Istanbul 
was assassinated, too.137 Stambulov was so depressed by all these assassinations, 
which exposed Russian conspiracies and all struggles between Russophiles and 
Russophobes in Bulgaria.138 After the assassinations, the attitude of the 
Stambulov’s government against the Russophiles became so severe that some 
three hundred Russophiles, who directly related with assassinations or not, were 
sent to prison and met with harsh treatment. However, his tough policy against 
the Russophiles or Russia itself began to create a frustration among the 
Bulgarians. 
Stambulov believed that there was Russian involvement, but the Russian 
government denied any connivance in these murders. From this point, the 
intrigues against Stambulov were stepped up by the Russophiles in Bulgaria, 
which added one more blow to the bleeding Bulgaria’s relations with Russia. In 
this vein, as a reaction to the assassinations, Stambulov continued to turn 
towards the Ottoman Empire and insisted on the recognition of the Prince for the 
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hope that this kind of murders would diminish under the head of a recognized 
prince. 139 Thanks to the recognized and legal prince, he hoped, the influence of 
Russia in Bulgaria would diminish.  
At that moment, both Ferdinand and Stambulov sought ways to increase 
to prestige of the prince through gaining recognition eventually. On one hand, in 
1892 the unrecognized Ferdinand visited European states to gain strength from 
them140: he even met with Bismark and Queen Victoria of England. In the same 
year, Stambulov was invited by the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II to Istanbul, 
and he was well greeted, while Russia wanted to disrupt that visit.141 The 
meeting between Stambulov and Abdulhamid was considered by many European 
statesmen as an unofficial recognition of the prince and the regime. Without a 
doubt, the Russian Tsar was not so pleased with Ferdinand’s visit and his 
meeting with heads of state and officials.142
 Moreover, there was another chance to reinforce the regime: The prince 
could marry and thus establish a dynasty for Bulgaria. This might provide 
protection against Russian intervention in case the Prince was killed. Moreover, 
it would also increase Ferdinand’s reputation in the eyes of the Great Powers. 
Between the years 1890 and 1893, Stambulov was engaged in this matter, and 
the most suitable bride was Princess Marie Louise of Bourbon-Parma. But the 
problem was that she came from a Catholic family and this was contrary to the 
Constitution, which required all Bulgarian Princess except the first to profess 
Orthodox creed. Eventually, with the influence of Stambulov despite many 
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obstacles, the related article was amended by the vote in the Sobranie143 and 
Ferdinand married with Princess Marie Lousie in Italy in 1893. This was without 
doubt a severe blow to Russia since the role of religion had a significant place in 
Russo-Bulgarian relations.144 Several Bulgarian ecclesiastical officials who had 
been educated in Russia demonstrated their adherence to the Prince. The 
Bulgarian orthodox hierarchy was the most important element that Russia could 
have influence on Bulgarian people; however their loyalty to the Prince was a 
vindication for Russia’s diminishing influence on Bulgaria. Further, as Charles 
Jelavich pointed out; 
Although Alexander III pursued a nationalistic policy himself, he 
could not understand that the Bulgarians could have a similar 
policy and that they would not willingly exchange Turkish and 
Russian overlordship. To the end of his reign Alexander refused 
to recognize that the Bulgarian people really supported the 
independent policy of their government.145
The reaction of St. Petersburg could also be attributed to the Tsar’s 
perception towards the Bulgarian people and the government itself. Whatever the 
reason of Russia’s anger to all these policies, the reality was that towards their 
national aspirations, Bulgaria had come a long way since 1878 in emerging from 
Russia’s shadow.  
 In 1893, frictions between Stambulov and Prince Ferdinand appeared. 
Ferdinand was as passive a ruler as he seemed in his initial years. ‘He dreamed 
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of leading Bulgaria to the position of the predominant power in the Balkans.’146 
It should be admitted that he had to depend on Stambulov as he gave his support 
during the candidacy. Nonetheless, Ferdinand, being a non-recognized Prince, 
was afterward fully aware of the dangers of his own position. The only choice to 
overcome this hardship was for him to reconcile with Russia. So from his 
perspective, then, the main obstacle became Stambulov himself. But he waited 
until he felt strong enough to dismiss his minister to establish his own ultimate 
dynasty. 
The root cause of the hostility between Stambulov and Ferdinand was the 
recognition of the legal status of Ferdinand’s election by the Russian Empire. 
Stambulov thought that the recognition by Russia would bring catastrophe and 
intrigue against the established order of things that would follow with the return 
of Russian minister and the Russian consuls.147 Stambulov worried that thawing 
of Russo-Bulgarian relations would allow the spread of Russian influence again. 
So there began the friction between the minister and prince pertaining to taking 
Russian side or not.  
Ferdinand was determined to take this issue seriously. Aware of the fact, 
that recognition by Russia was impossible so long as Stambulov remained in 
power. So the prince endeavored to get rid of the prime Minister as soon as 
possible and establish a Russophile government.148 Russian presence within the 
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principality caused severe conflicts and crisis but its absence could also be 
explosive in Bulgarian politics.  
The divergence of attitudes towards Russia in the struggle for the 
salvation of Bulgaria was the main friction between Stambulov and Ferdinand. 
In governing circles, there emerged an understanding that as long as Stambulov 
lived, the desired reconciliation with Russia and the recognition of the election 
of the Prince Ferdinand were unachievable.149  Further, his punishment of 
political opponents whom he regarded as the tools of Russia and the growing 
political importance of a group of statesmen pursuing strong Russophile ideas 
also triggered anti-Stambulovist propaganda. Eventually, because of the Prince’s 
opposition, Stambulov gave up and resigned in 1894.150 It is noteworthy that in 
an interview he publicly said that:  
I am persuaded that the interests of Russia and of Bulgaria are 
diametrically opposed and that is not possible to have peace 
between us.  [His opponents] Karavelov and Tsankov are 
persuaded of the opposite. According to them, the new direction 
of our politics is doomed for Bulgaria, the salvation being only in 
union with Russia. Naturally, they view me as an enemy of our 
fatherland. I completely understand them when they wish me 
dead, and I probably will be.151
It was Stambulov who built the conditions for the election of Ferdinand 
as a prince of Bulgaria, and thereby created the enemy who brought about his 
own downfall. His openly anti-Russian stance only inflamed Russophile-
Russophobe tensions in Bulgaria.152 After his resignation, A. G. Hulme Beaman, 
Stambulov’s British biographer and friend, said that: 
                                                 
149 Monroe, p. 81 
150 In 1895, Stambulov was assassinated, and during his last two days in the bed, he repeated that 
his murderer was the prince. 
151Perry, p.205 
152 Perry, p.237 
 51  
When he quitted the Presidential chair, Stambulov could probably 
remember how he had consolidated the union; held the country 
single-handed against the kidnappers of Prince Alexander; ruled it 
as Regent in the teeth of Russia; driven out the Russian 
Commissioners and Consuls; brought in a new prince, and kept 
him on the throne through a series of plots and dangers from 
within and without; reconciled the Church and the state, and draw 
close ties between Bulgaria and her Suzerain, the Sultan.153
 
2.2. Personal Regime of Prince Ferdinand: Reconciliation with Russia and 
Russia’s Recognition of Prince Ferdinand 
After Stambulov’s resignation, the major barrier to reconciliation with 
Russia was gone. When Stambulov resigned, the Prince appointed a complete 
Russophile cabinet headed by Constantine Stoilov (1853-1901), a conservative 
ruler.154  His chief goal was to put the relations with Russia on a normal footing. 
After the end of Stambulov’s regime, Russophile faction was resurrected. 
The extremist Russophile Karavelov was permitted to publish a newspaper 
called Zname (Banner).155 Ferdinand and Stoilov, supporting one another, also 
release a number of Russophiles from prison. Russophile Metropolitan Kliment, 
for example, was released soon after the fall of Stambulov.  Stoilov took 
additional measures to improve relations with Russia: elimination of 
Radoslavov, supporting Austria as the protector of Bulgaria and censorship 
against the press of Stambulovists was the important ones. The head of 
Progressive Liberal Party, Tsankov, another strong Russophile rapidly supported 
Ferdinand as a legitimate ruler.  
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Russophobe generals in the army were forced to retire.156 In short, 
Russophile circles in Bulgaria regained their position and had the chance to join 
governance. Stoilov clearly expressed the new policy of Bulgaria in an 
interview: 
It is not in our character to provoke Russia. If Germany and 
Austria and the other great powers are well disposed towards 
Russia why should we, a small state, play the role of the dog 
which barks at her?157  
Relations between Bulgaria and Russia improved dramatically under the 
new regime of Stoilov. In Russian diplomatic circles, there were rumors that 
after the fall of Ottoman Empire, Russia would again reconcile with Bulgaria.158  
Nonetheless, this was not to say that Bulgaria was willing to let itself fall entirely 
into the hands of Russia. In 1894, Stoilov made a speech on the Sobranie on 
foreign affairs and said:  
Bulgaria was prepared to do all it could do secure good relations 
with Russia but there were limits to the concessions she could 
make. She could not allow Russian possession or even use of 
Burgas and Varna159, she could not accept Russian officers again 
into the Bulgarian army, and of course she could not consider any 
change of Prince.160
It is an indication that Bulgaria’s relations with Russia would not be the 
same as it was during the process of liberation. Henceforth, even if Bulgaria had 
gained the confidence of Russia, it was not as a vassal but a state with its own 
politics and national identity. 
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About the Macedonian question, after the fall of Stambulov, there was no 
further obstacle to the full expression of what Macedonian revolutionaries 
desired. In June 1895, a number of extremists, several of them former officers of 
the Bulgarian army, formed raiding parties and crossed the frontier into 
Macedonia. Even one of them succeeded in seize the town of Melnik and hold it 
for some time against the Ottomans before he was obliged to flee across the 
border.161 In this position, the raiders hoped for the action of great powers under 
the leadership of Russia. But, despite the reconciliation between Russia and 
Bulgaria, Russia was not eager to get into the conflict and wanted to preserve 
status quo in the peninsula.  
The other important issue was the recognition problem which was 
already a constant headache since the election of Ferdinand. When he was 
elected by the Sobranie, his first and foremost stipulation was to be recognized 
by the Ottoman and Russian Empires. However, when he realized it was 
impossible at that stage, he took the risk about his future and came to Bulgaria. 
Ferdinand decided to brave Russian hostility and built his position in Bulgaria by 
playing up to the forces and ideals of Bulgarian nationalism.162  
Till 1896, Russia refused to recognize Prince Ferdinand as the ruler of 
Bulgaria. Other powers were also waiting for Russia’s consent before offering 
recognition.163 The reason behind Russia’s refusal to accept King Ferdinand as a 
legitimate ruler was that according to the Berlin Treaty, any Prince had to have 
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the approval of the signatory powers, and that condition it had not been 
followed. 
After Nicholas II became the new Tsar of Russia, Ferdinand thought that 
it would be a chance to get closer with Russia. He lobbied for his recognition by 
the Tsar and to rule over an independent state.164 To win the Tsar’s sympathy, 
Ferdinand unveiled the statue of Alexander II on the square opposite the 
Sobranie, and the built monument commemorating the battle of Shipka pass.165 
Primarily, Ferdinand’s little son was converted from Catholicism to Orthodoxy 
in 1896. This was an important step to restore the relations with Russia after the 
fall of Stambulov. They even asked the Tsar to be the godfather who performed 
the conversion. Nicholas II was willingly agreed and sent his representative to 
Sofia. By this conversion, Ferdinand sacrificed his son’s faith entirely for 
Bulgaria. 
In the wake of this conversion, in February 1896, a special envoy was 
sent to Bulgaria and Russia recognized Ferdinand as a legitimate ruler. 
Following Russia, the other powers offered Bulgaria recognition as well.166 It is 
important to note here that the day of recognition was the anniversary of the 
Yeşilköy Treaty; it might indicate reestablishment of the friendly relations 
between two powers as before. After the recognition in 1896, Ferdinand mostly 
pursued a Russophile policy.167 The officers appointed under Stambulov’s 
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regime were removed. Moreover, Russian training was promoted in the army.168 
However, Ferdinand, who was also called as “Fox of the Balkans” by a 
historian169, would guarantee the security and the stability of his country as much 
as possible. So, while he was pursuing smooth relations with Russia, on the other 
side he signed a Defense Pact with the Ottoman Empire in 1898.170
             Ferdinand gave his attention to the Macedonian issue, hoping to restore 
all Bulgarian territories of the Yeşilköy Treaty. Sofia used two types of policies 
regarding Macedonian question. First, Bulgaria assisted revolutionary activities 
in Macedonia and tried to attract the Slavic inhabitants of Macedonia to its side. 
In this effort, the Bulgarian exarchate had a tremendous role, because if two-
thirds population of a district was willing to join the exarchate, they had a 
permission to join.171 Secondly, it tried to make negotiations with Russian and 
the Ottoman Empire. Ferdinand had managed to get affirmation from the 
Ottoman Empire; Abdulhamid II had issued two degrees, which confirmed that 
new bishoprics should be placed under the jurisdiction of the exarch in 1894. 
However, from the Russian side, Ferdinand could not meet his expectations like 
recognition question.  
              Russia’s political ambitions were focused on Far East in the 1890s and 
the early 1900s.172 Russia wished only to preserve the status quo in the Balkan 
Peninsula. Considering the Macedonian problem, it was not so desirous to back 
an uprising by Bulgaria.173 St. Petersburg gave no encouragement to Bulgarian 
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claims in Macedonia. By the end of the 1890s, Russia was even considering the 
partition of the territory with the Serbs who had supremacy in the west of 
Vardar.174 By this method, Russia tried to strike the Bulgarians from their 
sensitive point. The reconciliation with Russia by means of recognition of Prince 
Ferdinand did little for Bulgaria in Macedonia. In 1897, Russia also had made an 
agreement with Austria to safeguard the peace in the southeast. This policy of 
cooperation with Austria-Hungary endured till 1908 and kept the peace in the 
Balkans even though the Macedonian question in these years repeatedly created 
a situation of crisis.  
               Still, despite friction over Macedonian question, Russia and Bulgaria 
had no wish to offend each other. To appease Russian concerns, Sofia took 
measures to control the move in Bulgaria. The Supreme Macedonian Committee, 
for example, aimed to conquer Macedonia by force. St. Petersburg was 
especially bothered by the activities of committee. Their propaganda continued 
and even in 1902 the provocateurs sent guerillas into Macedonia until absolute 
anarchy prevailed in that unfortunate region.175 Bulgarian Premier Danev agreed 
to meet with the Russians to solve the problem. Danev had to accept Russia’s 
overtures mostly because the amount of loans Russia gave Bulgaria was 
undeniable. So, in Sofia some Macedonian activists were expelled from the 
country and both civil servants and army officers were forbidden membership of 
the committees. The frontier line was strengthened by a new armed gendarmerie 
and as a last measure; the important komitacıs, members of the insurgent bands, 
with their leaders were taken under custody on the frontier. These negotiations 
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over Macedonia also led to a financial and military convention, signed with 
Russia. 
The military convention with Russia was accepted by Danev in May 
1902. In May 1902, It had a secret character and was not subjected to the 
endorsement of the national assembly as it should have in accordance with the 
constitution.176 Most of the war and foreign ministers of the period 1903-1912 
did not know about it at all. Russia agreed to help Bulgaria if the latter was 
attacked by Romania assisted by Austria.177 Moreover, the Russian military 
attachés were authorized to return to Bulgaria, although in practice this never 
happened. The Russian attaches would also have right to get knowledge about 
Bulgaria’s secret mobilization plans. It is obvious that this convention increased 
Russian interference in Bulgarian military. However, the convention was not 
approved by Ferdinand, and its validity was always questionable. This 
convention was also important as showing that Russia’s Balkan dreams were still 
surviving and the existence of Russophiles who advocated promoting Bulgarian 
national interests through alliance with Russia. 
 
2.3. Declaration of Independence: the Ottoman Reaction and Russia’s 
Mediating Role 
By 1908, the agreement between Austria and Russia was collapsing. 
Baron Lexa von Aehrenthal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, 
was planning a coup to annex the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia Herzogovina, 
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which had been administered and occupied by Austria since the Berlin Treaty. 
By the annexation, Austria planned to halt the dream of Serbians to create 
‘Greater Serbia’. On the other hand, Russian was contemplating the opening of 
the Straits to the Russian warships. By July 1908, Isvolsky suggested to 
Aehrenthal that if Russia and Austria came to a preliminary agreement, they 
might convince the other signatories of the Berlin Treaty with a good chance of 
getting them to consent to the proposed changes.178 Aehrenthal also gave a hint 
to Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand about his intentions, and the latter seemed to 
figure out what was aimed: were the status quo to be disturbed by the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, Vienna would welcome it if Sofia also 
violated the Berlin Treaty by declaring Bulgaria’s independence.179 In this way, 
Austria gave tacit support for Bulgaria to declare its independence.  
Even before Ferdinand’s recognition by the Great Powers, he had spoken 
of his desire for independence. In that year Ferdinand was preparing for the 
twentieth year celebration of his throne.  In 1908, the international arena was 
favorable for Bulgarian independence; Russia was still dwelling on internal 
disorders following its defeat in the war with Japan and subsequent revolution. 
The Ottoman Empire had been destabilized by the Young Turk Revolution 
organized by the Committee of Union of Progress. Ferdinand naturally wanted to 
exploit this new regime in Istanbul in his bid for independence. 
In September 1908, the Geshov crisis led to a break-up in the relations 
between Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. During that time, Geshov was the 
Bulgarian agent in Istanbul. The Ottoman government did not invite him to an 
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official banquet for the foreign diplomats to the honor of Sultan’s birthday in 
Istanbul since Bulgaria was still a province of the Ottoman Empire. The 
Bulgarian government was very offended and counted that action as a 
provocation to remind the Bulgarians their provincial status. After an official 
protest, Bulgarian government recalled Geshov. 
           Several few days later, another incident complicated and exacerbated the 
relations with Ottoman Empire. The workers of the Oriental Railroad, which 
linked Istanbul with the rest of Europe, went on a strike in late September 
1908180. And Bulgaria, for economic and military security, took over the entire 
line in Eastern Rumelia and did not give it back after the strike. Later they 
declared that this line would be integrated with Bulgarian State railroad; creating 
a diplomatic crisis. There was a general concern that Ferdinand was just about to 
declare Bulgaria’s independence, threatening the delicate balance of power in the 
Balkans.181
Particularly, St. Petersburg considered that Bulgaria’s independence as 
that moment would be the most dangerous to Austrian government. An 
exasperated Ottoman Empire would vent its resentment on small Bulgaria rather 
on the more powerful Austria-Hungarian Empire.182 It meant that the crisis 
would take an anti-Slavic direction. N.V. Charykov, the Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Russia, asked Bulgaria to delay the declaration of 
independence until March 1909, giving diplomats time to solve the problem by 
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means of negotiations.183 Russia informed Sofia that it was to support the 
declaration of independence, desiring to attain the consent of France, Britain, 
Italy and Germany even, but it should only take place after the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.184
However, Ferdinand did not give credence to these warnings and 
declared his independence on 5 October 1908. He proclaimed himself the ‘Tsars 
of the Bulgarians’, which greatly angered the Ottomans, as it meant that 
Ferdinand would have an authority and encouragement for rule over the 
Bulgarians in Macedonia. Marin Pundeff argues that:  
In assuming the title of tsar used by the Bulgarian medieval 
rulers, Ferdinand sought once again, as in naming his son after 
Boris I, to tap the deepest sources of Bulgarian historical 
traditions and nationalism. Greatly stimulated by proclamation of 
independence and the revival of the medieval tradition, the 
nationalists explained that “Tsar of the Bulgarians”, rather than 
“of Bulgaria”, signified the unity of Bulgarians everywhere under 
the scepter of Ferdinand.185  
 So, declaration of Bulgarian independence, emanated from Bulgarian 
national aspirations, was a great challenge to Russia’s role of ‘big brother’ on the 
Slavic nations. Ferdinand demonstrated his resolve to establish ‘Greater 
Bulgaria’ by declaring himself ‘Tsar of the Bulgarians’.  The day following the 
declaration, on 6 October, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
This annexation was thought to be related with the declaration of independence 
of Bulgaria, which of course greatly irritated diplomats, especially Isvolsky.  
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The initial reaction of the Tsar Nicholas II was to call the declaration of 
independence as ‘act of megalomaniac’.186 To respond the Russian Tsar 
Ferdinand immediately affirmed that he was placing himself on an equal plane 
with the Autocrat of all the Russians-who had so long held him at arm’s 
length.187 Maybe, the most embarrassing point for Russia, the so-called liberator 
of the Bulgarians, was that this action had been carried out in consent with 
Austria not Russia.  
After the annexation, when Isvolsky learnt Britain would not grant 
Russia special privileges in the straits, it was a severe blow to Russian position 
against Austria.188 Moreover, the annexation meant the end of 1897 agreement 
between Russia and Austria which had served the preservation of balance system 
in the Balkans in a great extent.189 In 1909, Russia now had to find a way to 
restore its interest in the Balkans as counter revenge against Austria-Hungary’s 
last action to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and this conflict between Bulgaria 
and the Ottoman Empire could be an opportunity to draw Bulgaria into Russia’s 
sphere of influence.190
At the same time, the dispute between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire 
turned out to be a “money crisis”. The latter was demanding tribute for the loss 
of Eastern Rumelia. Bulgaria was supposed to pay taxes to provide for Eastern 
Rumelia’s share of the Ottoman Public Dept.191 Further, the Oriental Railway 
Company was claiming compensation for the loss of its property in southern 
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Bulgaria. For all of them, Bulgaria could afford only 82 million francs while the 
Ottoman Empire was demanding 125 million francs.192 Thanks to the Russian 
initiative, the crisis between the Ottomans and Bulgarians was solved. The total 
money demanded by the Ottomans would not be paid totally by the Bulgarian 
side, but instead Russia ceased from its right to receive war indemnity which had 
been levied on Ottoman Empire after the war of 1877-78. Moreover, Russia also 
lent 82 million francs to Bulgaria in form of a loan with the modest level of 
interest-4.25 per cent.193
On 16 March 1909 in St. Petersburg, an agreement was signed in 
accordance with the Isvolsky’s proposal, and two sides demobilized their extra 
army units. Ottoman Empire had to accept the independence of Bulgaria. What is 
more, Ferdinand received a major loan from Austria, and Ferdinand’s attitude to 
two powers had a dualistic character on the point that, Bulgaria on the one side 
had been approached to Austria and on the other side it, at last had achieved to 
consolidate the relationship with Russia. So after the resolution of the crisis, the 
upcoming war between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire in the peninsula was 
halted by the intermediary role of Russia and also Bulgaria won its full 
independence. In the end, by the recognition of Russia, Italy, Germany, French 
and Austria he was called as ‘the King of the Bulgarians’. 
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 The solution of the crisis thanks to Russia, Bulgaria on behalf of the 
Entente powers, considerably increased its political influence in the Balkans. 
Bulgaria’s declaration of independence triggered Russia’s Balkan policy, Russia 
sought to recover its morale after its defeat in Russo-Japanese war in 1905. But, 
the real beneficiary was Bulgaria itself. From Russia’s perspective, it was a 
hollow victory. Temporarily, Russia at least reconciled with Bulgaria. However, 
it would not produce tangible results regarding the subsequent Balkan wars.  
Considering the general scheme of the Balkan Peninsula after the full 
independence of Bulgaria and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
Austria, there began both greater rapprochement of the Balkan countries to 
protect the peninsula from further penetration by Austria-Hungary, and also 
efforts to unite the Balkan people. So the Balkan League of 1911 was so near to 
come. 
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        CHAPTER THREE:  
                              THE BALKAN WARS AND 
BULGARIA’S ENTRY TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
 
       3.1. Balkan System of Alliance and Russia’s Dominance in the Balkans  
 The Balkan wars of 1912-1913 were the result of the national aspirations 
of the Balkan states, which perceived the territories of Ottoman Empire in 
Europe as theirs, and had been taken from their hands by force centuries before. 
So their main task was to liberate their brothers outside of their territorial borders 
and also win territorial aggrandizement at the expense of their rivals. The 
Yeşilköy “syndrome” in Bulgaria now spread to the all the Balkan states. For 
Bulgaria in particular, these wars were regarded as the wars of liberation to unite 
the Bulgarian nation into the Yeşilköy Bulgaria. 
 When Italy launched was against the Ottoman Empire in 1911 over 
Tripoli and reached Ottoman possessions in the eastern Mediterranean, this event 
gave Balkan states a great opportunity to unite against their ‘sick’ enemy and 
they hastened their negotiations. In one year, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and 
Montenegro tied themselves by bilateral agreements. With the Serbia-Bulgarian 
Treaty of Alliance on 13 March 1912, Greece and Bulgarian alliance on 29 May 
1912, Bulgarian and Montenegrin understanding on 28 August 1912, and 
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Serbian-Montenegrin Treaty of Alliance on 6 October 1912, Balkan unity was 
formed and they were prepared to confront Ottomans.   
 Complicating the Balkan conflicts was the rivalry between Russia and 
Austria-Hungary. Their competition never ended: even during their Balkan 
entente from 1897 to 1908, they carefully observed each others actions in the 
peninsula.194 Since Russia’s defeat by Japanese in 1905 and weakening of 
Russia’s diplomatic leverage comparing to the Austrians in 1909, the Russians 
had sought a more active role in the Balkans. 
  Alexander Isvolsky, Foreign Minister of Russia had commenced a policy 
to consolidate the relations between Balkan states under the supervision of 
Russia. Especially, the aim of Russia was to build a wall against the German or 
Austria-Hungarian penetration to the Balkans until Russia was prepared to act 
decisively and unilaterally.195 Russia tried to preserve the status quo in Balkans 
as much as possible, while still showing that they had Slav interest at heart. To 
Russia, the Slav states must unite and work together and thus fulfill the principle 
of ‘the Balkans for the Balkan states’. The Balkan alliance for Russia meant the 
Slavic League under the patronage of Russia arbitrating and reconciling between 
the Slav nationalities and so forestalling Austria from utilizing their 
contentions.196
 Russia encouraged the formation of an anti-Austrian Balkan union 
between Bulgaria and Serbia. The policy was mainly implemented by Anatole 
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Vasil’evich Nekliudov197, Russian ambassador in Sofia and Nicholas 
Genrikovich Hartwig198, Russian ambassador in Belgrade.  
In the negotiations, the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1904 would be the 
basis of the negotiations.199 This agreement provided for military cooperation 
against both the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires200 and the arrangement for 
Macedonia, being a major dispute between two Slavic states from the beginning. 
This treaty was compromised in a secret annex that in the event that autonomous 
status for Macedonia proved impossible to achieve, the province would be 
partitioned and giving the northern part to Serbia and the southern part to 
Bulgaria. Ownership of the ‘disputed zone’ was to be decided by Nicholas II of 
Russia. These negotiations began in September 1911 till March 1912, within the 
supervision of Russian representatives, whose aims were to preserve status quo 
and the formation of affront against the Habsburg Empire.201
 To reach an agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia was not easy. 
During the negotiations, Bulgaria was so reluctant to discuss the partition of 
Macedonia. After several months, they finally narrowed their differences to a 
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small disputed area, the division of which, assuming a victorious war against the 
Ottomans, was to be decided by the Russian Tsar.202 This time, after three 
months of negotiations, in May 1912, Bulgaria signed an alliance with Serbia, at 
times facilitated by energetic encouragement of the Russian minister in 
Belgrade, Hartwig and Nekliudov.203 The importance of Russian support in the 
negotiations was emphasized by both sides because they needed Russia as the 
arbiter of their own differences, and also its political support was essential to 
prevent great powers from avoiding any gains at the expense of the Ottoman 
Empire.204  
 In the international arena, Bulgarian position was favorable compared to 
Serbia’s. Because for both Russia and Austria-Hungary, having friendly relations 
with Bulgaria were advantageous and necessary.205 For Russia, Bulgarian 
position was critical considering Straits and Istanbul. For Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria could be a check against Serbian expansion and also Austria’s interests 
in the Near East.206 These advantages allowed Bulgaria to act more freely than 
the other Balkan states. 
 This unity between two former rivals gave a great satisfaction to Russia. 
Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Dimitrievich Sazanov felt that this alliance 
sponsored by St. Petersburg would give Russia some control over events and 
help defense its interests in the Balkans. He wrote that: 
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We could only endeavor to lessen the acuteness of the situation 
by taking an active part in bringing about a rapprochement 
between the various Balkan states. We hoped that by showing a 
united front they might reduce the risks attendant on their 
inevitable struggle with the Young Turks over the Balkan 
problem, and perhaps with Austria-Hungary also, in the event, 
always to be reckoned with, that the latter should attempt a fresh 
hostile move.207
 Russia thought that this alliance would bring an end to the disputes 
between Slavic states of the Balkans and eventually that unity would bring them 
to the sphere of influence of Russia. It could also provide assurance to Russia to 
be the dominant figure in the peninsula and increase its influence on Straits 
regarding the ultimate demise of the Ottoman Empire. In addition to this, the 
clauses related with defense against Austria-Hungary were also important for 
opportunity of the Russian penetration to the peninsula. As William Langer said 
“the beauty of a Balkan League would be that it could be like a two-edged 
sword, against the Austrians or the Turks, as the situation demanded”.208
 Naturally, the perceptions of the two Balkan states were different from 
Russia’s. The main impetus for the alliance was not the threat of Austria-
Hungary, but their irredentist policy in the region. Having felt the Ottomans’ 
decaying, they grasped the opportunity to share their scope of interests and the 
clauses directed against Ottoman Empire were their main considerations rather 
than the ones related with Austria-Hungary. So, as all these views suggests 
Russia and the two Balkan states considered their own interests which were not 
matching each other. Again, the Yeşilköy “syndrome”, created by Russia, rose 
again. Bulgaria now as an independent state pursued its own national interests in 
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the Balkans. The scourge of Bulgarian irredentist policy became a constant 
headache for Russia.  
 Further, in addition to this alliance system, building on controversial 
basis, the Great Powers were concerned about each other’s intentions; Russia 
was also suspected by the other powers for its encouragement to form alliances 
and expel the Ottomans from Macedonia. Austria-Hungary feared Russia’s role 
in this initiative. And Germany was worried about the situation of Ottomans, as 
at that time it was backing the preservation of Ottoman Empire integrity. 
 After secret Serbia-Bulgarian military and political agreement in 1912, 
the Sofia government also opened the talks with Greece for an alliance, the 
Greek Premier Elephtherios Venizelos in particular had been eager to reach an 
arrangement with Bulgaria directed against The Ottoman Empire since the spring 
of 1911.209 However, both sides were under pressure about their claims on 
Macedonia, they were cognizant of the difficulty of the establishment of a formal 
agreement. Besides, they could not rely on the arbitrator role of the Russia as this 
Slavic state was not so enthusiastic to see Greece and Bulgaria as allies. Further, 
as this alliance was bound to be anti-Ottoman not anti-Austrian, Russia always 
had suspicion since the beginning of the negotiations.210 After several 
negotiations, in the final meeting, Greece gave up its demand that provisions for 
the division of Macedonia to be included in the agreement and also Bulgaria had 
to abandon its insist on an open statement in favor of Macedonian autonomy.211 
Eventually, on 29 May 1912, these two states signed a treaty providing for 
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political and military cooperation against the Ottoman Empire without 
stipulating any specific division of Ottoman territories.212 In this treaty, sides 
were definitely planning to attack The Ottoman Empire. Here, it should be 
pointed out that this agreement was not the indication of Bulgarian-Greece 
lasting friendship, but the eradication of the suspicion and the need for 
dependency on each other. 
 In 1912, Greece also negotiated with Serbia and Montenegro, and 
Bulgaria negotiated with Montenegro.213 Thus the Balkan league was complete: 
Bulgaria had a formal alliance with Serbia, Greece and Montenegro. Serbia had a 
written alliance with Montenegro. Centering at Sofia, all these military and 
political agreements signed by the Balkan states to form the Balkan alliance had 
the aim of putting a complete end to Ottoman role in the Balkans despite its 
complexity. It was the failure of Russia’s Panslavist policy to liberate the Slavic 
nations while keeping them under its control. From now on, it was so clear that 
Russia created a monster born in 1877. 
 Now, all of the powers had become deeply concerned about the 
dangerous situation, almost in all states there were growing pressures to wage a 
war and the public opinions were by and large bellicose.214 Russian government 
sent direct warnings to Balkan capitals and entered into discussions with the 
great powers.215 When the Balkan allies gave the signs of acting independently 
and attacking The Ottoman Empire on their own, then Russia began to curb them 
                                                 
212 However, this ambiguity created problems; Bulgaria tried to make an alliance with the Greeks 
and was confident that their own stronger army could seize the Macedonian territories before the 
Greeks could arrive, but this fault of Bulgaria would have important effects in the Balkan wars. 
213 In reality, Russia was opposed to the joint of Montenegro to the Serbian-Bulgarian alliance. It 
thought that Montenegro could make the alliance uncontrollable and St. Petersburg was even 
concerned about that Montenegro would betray the arrangement to Vienna. Dakin, p.348 
214 Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan, p.231 
215 ibid. 
 71  
as much as possible. Certainly, As Douglas Dakin assessed ‘this Balkan League 
was like a diplomatic weapon forged by Russia; it was designed by Russia to 
restrain Austria; but if only bluff was intended it was a dangerous weapon for its 
charge was likely to explode of its own accord’.216 Russia and Austria-Hungary 
warned the Balkan powers not to incite any kind of conflict in the peninsula. 
Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei D. Sazanov reminded Bulgaria and Serbia that 
Russia had supported alliance between them because it promised to eliminate the 
divergences between them. But Russia realized that this alliance was purely their 
own selfish interests. Sazonov continued, 
In the event that in spite of our warnings the two states decide 
now to employ their alliance to launch a joint attack on Turkey… 
and to expose their territorial integrity and independence to a 
ruinous ordeal, then we deem it our duty to warn them in advance 
that in such a case we will be guided solely by our concern for the 
direct and immediate interests of Russia.217
  Such warnings were fruitless: Balkan states closed the eyes to Russia’s 
orders. They would go to war with The Ottoman Empire, unless the latter made 
reforms to provide for administrative autonomy considering the ethnic 
nationalities in the Ottoman territories. They received no such offer from the 
Porte. And eventually, armed conflict began with Montenegrin declaration of 
war against the Porte on 8 October 1912. The Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian 
governments decided to go to war on 17 October.218 This was a major failure of 
the Russian diplomacy. All the Balkan states were aware of the fact that the great 
powers would never be able to cooperate long enough and closely enough to 
enforce their threat of no annexation.219 As a last word, there was an excellent 
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sentence of the French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré about Russia’s failed 
policy in the Balkan crisis : “It is too late to wipe out the movement which 
Russia has called forth… she is trying to put on the brakes, but it is she who 
started the motor.”220 Russia assumed Bulgaria as a potential protectorate. 
However, after the Yeşilköy Treaty, Russia prepared its own failure in the 
Bulgarian policy. Now, the old Slavic vassal state ruined all Russian dreams in 
the Balkans. 
 
3.2. The Balkan Wars 1912-1913 and the Outcomes for Bulgaria 
3.2.1. The Failure of the Russian Policy and the First Balkan 
War  
 Ottoman control in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia and Albania, 
had deteriorated by the end of 1912. The revolt of the Albanian tribes and the 
provocation of the Macedonian revolutionary activities, protest meetings and 
massacres were out of control of the Ottoman controls. Russian leaders had not 
desired to make the Balkan conflict an international issue. They had wanted to 
delay any decisive changes in the Balkans until Russia was powerful enough to 
take into control the whole peninsula.221 Yet, when Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece 
and Montenegro decided to wage a war against the Ottoman Empire, Russia felt 
badly let down, it tried to forestall the outbreak of the war before, but when it 
failed then to localize it in collaboration with the other great powers.222 Until the 
outbreak of the war, Russia blamed Bulgaria for the failure of the status quo in 
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the region, but after the beginning of the war, Russia began to blame The 
Ottoman Empire for failing on reforms and for the war itself.  
 After breaking off the status quo in the Balkans, Sazanov insisted on the 
principle that “as long as Ottoman Empire survived, we would not tolerate any 
other power, great or small, at Istanbul or Straits. After ‘sick man of Europe’ 
passed away, the region was to come under the control of the Russian 
Empire.”223 However, with the outbreak of war, Russian policy ultimately 
collapsed.  
 The small states of the Balkans now dared to give a blow to Ottomans 
themselves instead of following the advice of Russia. The public opinion in 
many states was also in favor of the Balkan war.224 The Balkan states’ plan was 
for Greeks and Serbs to advance from the south and north on Salonika, while 
Bulgaria would advance on Istanbul. The Montenegrins were to advance on 
Skutari. Also, in accordance with the terms of the military convention with 
Serbia, Bulgaria promised to supply an army not less than 200,000 soldiers in 
case of an attack from Austria-Hungary.225.  
 In the war, the Ottoman army was defeated, holding out only at the 
fortresses in Edirne, Yanina and Skutari. Bulgarian Army occupied Kırklareli on 
October 24 and Ottoman defense in Lüleburgaz completely collapsed due to the 
superiority of the Bulgarian artillery. The Ottomans had to retreat towards the 
Çatalca lines, the main defensive works before Istanbul. In November 1912, with 
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the advance of the Bulgarian army, the capture of Istanbul appeared imminent.226 
However, Russia was completely opposed to Istanbul falling into Bulgarian 
hands. Sazanov declared that on the Bosphorus there could only be the Ottomans 
or Russians.227 Sazanov also wrote to Alexander Isvolsky, Foreign Minister of 
Russia that if the Bulgarians went into Istanbul, they would be attacked by 
Russia within twenty-four hours. In Istanbul, Bulgarian forces could face the 
Russian Black Sea fleet.228 So, the small Balkan state was now in a position to 
confront with their liberator.  
 On the other hand, Ferdinand of Bulgaria was dreaming to enter Istanbul 
as ‘Byzantine Emperor’ and to make it the new capital of even larger Bulgarian 
state.229 Nonetheless, Russia, desiring the control of straits for two centuries, 
would not allow Bulgaria in. Russian diplomats appealed to Britain and France 
to restrain the Bulgarians, but Ferdinand did not bear in mind their warnings, he 
thought that it was not just a matter of entering Istanbul, but since his arrival in 
Bulgaria he had contemplated placing upon his head the Crown of Byzantium.230  
So, he decided to advance.231 Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Ivan E. Geshov also 
thought the temporary occupation of Istanbul would give them the most and 
effective guarantee for the conclusion of a peace treaty favorable to Bulgaria.232  
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 The Bulgarian side launched their assault, but with loss of at least 10,000 
men. But this time Ferdinand’s army was thrown back by the Ottoman forces in 
Çatalca defense. Moreover, Bulgarian army had to fight against cholera and 
dysentery, also the shortages of food and ammunition affected the Bulgarian 
failure. So the Bulgarians surrendered to advance to Istanbul. However, the 
earlier victories of Bulgaria had led The Ottoman Empire appeal for armistice. 
 During the Bulgarian advance, Russia anticipated that the Bulgarians 
would not do anything upsetting them by attacking Çatalca. However, the 
Ottoman defeats were unwelcome to Russia. Sazanov told the Bulgarian minister 
in St. Petersburg that “Be content with San Stefano Bulgaria and do not enter 
Constantinople under any circumstances, because you will otherwise complicate 
your affairs too gravely!”233 Sazanov also threatened that Russia might allow the 
intervention of Ottomans’ protectors, Britain and France. Further, Vladimir 
Kokotsov, the Prime Minister of Russia and Tsar agreed that the Russian 
ambassador in Istanbul should be empowered to summon the Black Sea 
squadron if this seemed necessary.234 So, Russia’s reaction to Bulgarian advance 
through the straits was to intimidate it as much as possible. 
 Russia’s policy during the crisis was hindered by the usual inconsistency. 
Hartwig, the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, and Colonel Georgy Romanovski, 
the military attaché in Sofia, disregarded their own national policy and 
vigorously encouraged against The Ottoman Empire the states to which they 
were accredited. It had been also the same during the time of Alexander 
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Battenberg, in which the Russian agents played on the opposite side in the same 
space- Bulgaria. 
 It was ironic that Bulgaria, a Russia-liberated nation, was now daring to 
conquer the city that had been in Russia’s dreams for centuries. The advance of 
the Bulgarians to Istanbul was a strong blow to Russia’s control over Bulgaria 
and the balances of power between two states, which had always been in favor of 
Russia. It was excellent example of how Russia had to choose between its own 
interests or the new Slavic state whose existence was mostly the result of 
Russian doings235. Sazanov would do what he could do for Bulgaria, but he 
would not permanently sacrifice Russia’s own interests for Sofia’s benefit.236Had 
the Bulgarians captured Istanbul and Straits, it would have been humiliating for 
the Russians to see their former vassal posing as Byzantine Emperor! Bulgaria 
and Russia would have changed their roles. Bulgaria, having straits in its hands, 
could have controlled Russia by permitting passing from the Straits. 
 Forgotten in the drama over Istanbul, the original objective of Bulgaria 
had been to capture Macedonia with its main city and seaport, Salonika. 
However, geography determined who fought where.237 The terms of the treaty 
with the Balkan states had compelled Bulgaria to make Istanbul its objective and 
Thrace its campaigning ground.238 However, Macedonia had remained its main 
target. As Bulgaria drew its forces into Eastern Thrace, the Macedonian 
territories were left to Greece and Serbia. When Bulgarian units advanced 
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through the western frontier, Salonika, they found that Macedonia was already 
occupied by the Greeks and Serbians. Besides, the Serbs were not willing to 
respect the treaty with Bulgaria regarding the division of Macedonia. 239So the 
Balkan allies found themselves in a condition like a Gordian knot. They were all 
entwined together in mutual greed on Macedonian problem. The Balkan states 
now demonstrated the signs of being in the ‘powder keg of Europe’ by their 
irredentist policies. 
 Even if an armistice was signed, no side was satisfied with their 
possessions. Greece even did not recognize armistice in order to continue the 
siege of Yanina. Hostilities between the sides were not settled down at the 
conference in London240 because of the disputes mainly on Albania, Edirne, 
Istanbul, the frontier of Romania. In the end, discussions producing no results 
were put an end by a coup in Istanbul on 23 January 1913.241 So, Balkan states, 
seeking to break armistice resumed the hostilities and in the second round of the 
first Balkan war, Bulgaria captured Edirne (by a combined Serbian and 
Bulgarian army), Greece Yanina and Montenegro Skutari.242   
 After the fall of Edirne, the last fortress city between Bulgaria and The 
Ottoman Empire, the concentric attack by the allied armies quickly ended the 
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war in military terms. The Ottomans asked for mediation of powers. By the 
Treaty of London on 30 May 1913, they had to cede the territories in the west of 
Enez-Midye line, drawn from Enez near end of Meriç to Midye on the Black 
Sea, in Eastern Thrace.243 The Ottoman possession in Europe was diminished to 
a small area around Istanbul.244  
After the end of the first Balkan war, three Balkan states began to quarrel 
with competing claims on captured territories, Macedonia in particular since the 
claims on Macedonia were not decided. It is possible here to cite the words of 
Count Ignatiev in the middle of nineteenth century about the nature of the 
Balkan people, which was also suitable for the atmosphere of the eve of the 
second Balkan war:  
It is inevitable that once the struggle with the Turks is ended, race 
rivalries will reappear and nothing stable will be built in the 
Balkan Peninsula until many years have elapsed. But sufficient 
unto the day is the evil thereof.245
  As Count Ignatiev highlighted the nature of the Balkan states, the 
Russians had made an incredible mistake at Yeşilköy, of unleashing these ethnic 
rivalries. So, the ingratitude of the Bulgarians came into being. About the 
Macedonian question, the Bulgarians were so greedy that some Bulgarian 
statesmen even began to demand the whole of Macedonia.246 Bulgaria also 
violated the clauses of the treaty between Serbia as the Bulgarians had not given 
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the Serbians military assistance in the Vardar Valley while the Serbians for their 
part had aided the Bulgarians. The Serbians thought they were right to demand 
territorial compensation in Macedonia; firstly because they sided with Bulgaria 
by sending 50,000 men to Edirne, but Bulgaria gave them cold shoulder instead. 
Another fact was that while Serbia was disappointed for its hopes of reaching the 
Adriatic coasts, Bulgaria acquired Thrace. So Serbia thought that it had right to 
claim compensation.   
 Meanwhile, a new danger emerged in the northern side of Bulgaria. 
Romania began to ask compensation from Bulgaria for latter’s invasions and 
threatened Bulgaria to seize Silistra, whose population was entirely Bulgarian.  
On July 4th, Stoyan Danev appealed to Sazanov to stop Romania, but he refused 
to do since this would mean intervention on behalf of Bulgaria against Serbia 
and Greece.247 However, it was not the end of the hope of Bulgaria, Danev and 
King Ferdinand renewed their proposals both the Bulgarian Minister in St. 
Petersburg and the Russian Minister at Sofia to bring the cessation of hostilities 
but Russia, fearing of Bulgaria’s aspirations on Istanbul and suspicious of its 
future policy, did not take action for and Romanian forces advanced into 
Bulgarian territory.248   
 There were also disputes on the establishment of an Autonomous 
Albanian state. But Serbia demanded additional territories in Macedonian 
territories claimed by the Bulgarians, in exchange of sacrificing to the new state. 
Moreover, between Bulgaria and Greece, Salonika was the sticking point. 
Romania was also insisting on its claims on Dobruca.  
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 The prevailing atmosphere in Balkan Peninsula after the first Balkan war 
was full of profound differences, underlying motives which troubled the allies 
and also secret negotiations, intrigues and suspicions, which would eventually 
drag them into another disastrous war. Clearly, the First Balkan war did not 
provide a consistent and final resolution to the national and political issues of the 
Balkan nations. The respective positions of the Balkan states were much the 
same as they had been when this question faced Europe in 1912.249  
 In January 1913, Prince Alexander of Serbia and Prince Nicholas of 
Greece came together in Salonika for an alliance against Bulgaria for the 
partition of Macedonia.250 They requested Bulgaria to revise the Macedonian 
frontiers between allies, but certainly Bulgaria refused it.251 Its former 
benefactor, Bulgaria requested Russia, to solve the conflicts between Serbia 
about Macedonia. However, the hope of Bulgarians would be shaken when 
Russia advised the Bulgarians to give the Serbs some additional territory from 
their share of Macedonia. Meantime, in June 1913, Serbian-Greek Treaty was 
signed in Salonika directed against Bulgaria.252 The Russian Tsar instantly sent 
telegrams to the Serbian and Greek Kings warning that: 
A war between the allies would not leave me indifferent; in fact, I 
should like to make it clear that the State which commences war 
will be held responsible before the Slav cause and that I reserve to 
myself full liberty concerning the attitude which Russia will adopt 
at the end of such a criminal war.253
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Here, Russia revealed its two-sided policy again. Russia tried to support 
Slavs on the one hand, to maintain stability and preserve status quo on the other 
hand. However, it was not possible to attain the same aims at once.  
 
3.2.2. The Inter-Allied War and Bulgaria’s Failure 
To resolve the disputes, the sides appealed to St. Petersburg. Russia, 
fearing to disappoint each of them, failed to take a definite and consistent stand 
on each claim.  Sazanov promised over and over again to support the territorial 
pretensions of each party. Yet, it was impracticable as every side’s claims were 
conflicting and overlapping with each other. So, the last minutes efforts of the 
Russia did not halt the Inter-Allied war. 
   It was a great disappointment for Bulgaria that Russia, the founder of 
the alliance was now irresolute; it could mean the end of the alliance too. The 
inconsistency of Sazanov’s policies weakened Geshov’s position and helped to 
bring about his downfall.  In this circumstances the Bulgarian authority was also 
upset, at last the Prime Minister Ivan E. Geshov resigned office on May 1913. 
The new Prime Minister, Stoyan Danev, known as strong Russophile, aimed to 
preserve Balkan alliance by enlisting Russia to resolve the conflict with the 
Serbs, but even he was disappointed from the inconsistency of the Russian 
attempts.254 The Russian side was reluctant to accept the responsibility of the 
arbitration under the conditions of London Treaty, simply because Sazanov was 
frustrated by the attitude of Bulgarian pretensions to Istanbul.  
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Besides, both Ferdinand and Prime Minister Danev were threatened with 
assassination by Macedonian groups if they would require Russian arbitration.255 
There was also a growing discontent in the Bulgarian army. General Mikhail 
Savov, the commander-in-chief, rejected Russia’s mediating role and wanted to 
invade whole Macedonia and later demanded from the Bulgarian government to 
decide fight or demobilize the army.256At the same time, the public opinion in 
Bulgaria was mostly pro-war. Ferdinand was also under a great pressure to wage 
a war on behalf of Macedonia. Simultaneously, Savov was urging Ferdinand to 
attack, believing that the army could defeat the Greeks and Serbs.257  
 With tacit Serbian-Greek agreement, Danev, with the consent of 
Ferdinand, asked Russia to make a seven days arbitral award on the basis of the 
Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty. However, Sazonov, resenting the time-limit, told the 
Minister in Russia that he wished to wash his hands of Bulgaria and continued: 
…you are free, Russia and Slavdom are rejected…after your 
declaration I communicate ours to you! Do not expect anything 
from us and forget the existence of any of our engagements from 
1902 until today!258
 In effect Russia had renounced the Russo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1902, 
which was the legal basis for Russian support for Bulgaria in the case of current 
problems on Macedonia and Romania. However, Russia did not back Serbian 
territorial claims against Bulgaria either; the policy of St. Petersburg was to 
alienate no side. Even if Russia was fully aware of the everlasting territorial 
claims of Balkan States, it failed to arbitrate them and ultimately the Balkan 
allies were alienated from each other.   
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So, for Ferdinand, there remained no other choice other than attack. With 
no formal declaration of war, he ordered the General staff to attack Greek and 
Serbian lines in Macedonia on 29 June 1913.259 It was also rumored that 
Ferdinand relied on Austria’s coming to the assistance of Bulgaria.260 Without 
doubt, this decision, emerged from a deadlock would bring a catastrophic ending 
to Bulgaria. 
Greece and Serbia answered with a declaration of war. Soon Montenegro 
and Romania, too declared war on Bulgaria. Lastly, the Ottoman Empire 
followed suit. The only country in Europe to suffer invasion on every frontier 
from every neighbor was Bulgaria.261From the west, Bulgaria suffered the 
attacks of Serbia on the left bank of the River Varna.  Serbia took north and 
central Macedonia, including Monastir. Form the south, Greece was advancing 
and received Salonika, Kavala and greater part of the coast of Macedonia. Above 
all, the Bulgarian troops in Salonika were forced to capitulate after a great loss. 
In the north, Romania crossed the Danube with 150,000 soldiers and occupied 
the Dobruca quadrilateral without opposition. And also the Ottoman Empire 
advanced and regained the greater part of Thrace, including Edirne and 
Kırklareli.262 There was none to save it and its enemies had surrounded from 
every side. The Second Balkan War was Bulgaria’s disaster and a term of 
supreme humiliation.  
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In the Second Balkan War, Bulgarian government misestimated the 
Russian interests regarding the Balkans. Bulgarian attack on Serbia meant the 
split of Balkan League, which angered Russia as it would benefit Austria.  The 
fatal decision to attack the Serbian and Greek positions in Macedonia on June 29 
was made by Ferdinand himself as commander in chief, presumably for the 
purpose of forcing Russia to intervene diplomatically and rule in Bulgaria’s 
favor.263
 Ferdinand and Danev did not realize that Russia’s policy was not so 
friendly to them; they thought that a military incident would force Russia to give 
a favorable arbitral award.264 Also, the Bulgarian side underestimated the 
capability of the Greeks and Serbians to offense in such rapidity. 
 After such a calamity, it seemed that Bulgaria would have to accept peace 
at any price.265 And Russia presented a proposal to all sides for the armistice, but 
its efforts had produced no results. Repeated efforts did not stop Rumanian 
advance and also Serbia and Greece did not accept Russian proposal.266 This 
severely affected Bulgarian politics. Russia’s inability to stop the Rumanian 
advance and the failure of the Russian arbitration led to the fall of the 
administration on 13 July. In some Russophobe circles, it was said that Danev 
had made a mistake by relying on Russian support. The head of the new 
government was Vassil Radoslavov, who was perfectly Austrophile. He 
immediately appealed to Austria for help for finding a way to save the country 
from this catastrophe. But Austria preferred to wait instead of giving a quick 
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response. He had no choice other than to submit unconditionally in order to 
obtain an armistice.  On the other side, Russia failed to halt the advance of 
Romania from the north despite Danev’s several appeals.267  
 Defeated in the Second Balkan war, Bulgaria had to make territorial 
concessions under the Treaty of Bucharest on 10 August 1913. Romania 
received the Southern Dobruca. Macedonia was partitioned between Serbia and 
Greece and Bulgaria, but Bulgaria received the smallest part of southeastern 
Macedonia, known as Pirin Macedonia, a net gain of 9,663 square miles.  The 
Ottoman Empire regained territories in Thrace.268 Bulgaria accepted these 
sacrifices because it hoped that this treaty would be revised by the Great Powers 
in a conference. The leader of the Bulgarian delegation at Bucharest stated that 
“Either the Powers will change it, or we ourselves will destroy it”.269 But Serbia, 
Greece and Romania strongly opposed to the revision of the treaty. Thus, at the 
end of the Balkan wars, Serbia and Greece nearly doubled their territories at the 
expense of Bulgaria.  
 All in all, it is already well-known that there was no mutual trust for the 
dream of ever lasting Balkan alliance before and during the wars. Each side was 
suspicious of the others: they had made alliances simply because of Russian 
pressure, Ottoman weakness and the advantageous environment of the Ottoman-
Italy war. All these inspiration brought the Balkan states together. The first war 
saw Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro allied against the Ottoman 
Empire, and in the second Balkan war, Bulgaria found itself in the middle of its 
                                                 
267 Adversely, in Bulgaria there was an opinion that Russia itself urged Romania to take    action 
against Bulgaria. Constant, pp.280-281 
268 Bulgaria and The Ottoman Empire signed a separate agreement in Istanbul 30 September 
1913; the Russian anyway just did half-hearted attempts to hold Edirne for Bulgaria. 
269 Richard Hall, The Balkan Wars, p.125 
 86  
enemies and also the Ottoman Empire. It brought the ultimate defeat of Bulgaria 
and its irritant repercussions. It had to withdraw from the territories just gained 
from the Ottomans in the first war; Sofia was also irritated by the annexation of 
Macedonian territory by Greece and Serbia. 
 Bulgaria was the state which had attained the most significant successes, 
and also the most sacrifices, as Pundeff asserted: 
  The nation was stunned. Within a month, triumphs, and 
world acclaim had turned into utter defeat and humiliation. 
Macedonia, as Bulgarians thought of it, was no longer under a 
disintegrating empire but in the hands of assertive bent on driving 
Bulgarian influence from the parts they had seized. In southern 
Dobrudja and eastern Thrace, Romania and Turkey had the same 
objective…. Internationally, Bulgaria had ended up friendless, 
despite the injustices it had suffered; even Russia, the liberator of 
1878, had sided with Romania and Serbia.270
 With the Balkan Wars, Sofia in particular had not desired a geographic 
division of Macedonia with Greece and Serbia. In addition to this, the 
noncommittal attitude of Russia and its obscurity, however being a guarantor of 
the March 1912 Treaty, was another underlying reason for the calamity of the 
Balkan wars.   
During the war, an important element undermining Russia-Bulgarian 
relations was that, in the wake of declaration of independence of Bulgaria in 
1908, Serbia became more important state for Russia than Bulgaria.271 As seen 
from the Balkan wars, Bulgaria had been willing to enter to Istanbul, the city in 
Russia’s dreams for centuries on one side; and Serbia as Austria-Hungary’s 
enemy, whose territorial ambitions was no longer coincided with Russia, on the 
other hand could be a bulwark against Austria, Russia’s main challenger in the 
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Balkans. For Russia, Serbia had become the most dependent and least 
threatening bastion in the Balkans.272
After the second Balkan war, Bulgaria was leaning in the direction of an 
alliance with the Central powers for its considerations about Macedonia, which 
was still in the center of Bulgarian interests. The treaty of Bucharest drove 
Bulgaria into the arms of Austria, as it seemed Russia had abandoned Sofia. 
After the Balkan Wars, Russian Balkan policy was strongly critized by the 
Russian press; the conservative Novoe Vremia, published articles under such 
acerbic headlines such as “Diplomatic Mukden” and “Diplomatic Tsushima”.273  
 
 
3.3. The Outbreak of First World War and Bulgaria’s Entry into the 
War on the Side of Central Powers  
The Treaty of Bucharest did not settle anything but annihilated all earlier 
possibilities and combinations for reaching and maintaining a balance in the 
Balkans between states. The period between the end of second Balkan war and 
the beginning of First World War was little more than a breathing spell during 
which the Balkan states jockeyed for position.274 When the world war began, 
small Balkan states, one by one, would collaborate with the big powers that were 
able to meet their ambitions.  
Bulgaria’s main territorial ambition was to acquire all of Macedonia, 
including important areas under Serbian control and the regions acquired by 
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Greece, especially Kavala.275 Dobruca was also the other concern of Bulgaria. 
Both Central Powers and the allies were concerned of Bulgarian claims against 
Romania and Greece. The national aim of Bulgaria was explicitly put forward by 
the Bulgarian Prime Minister after the entrance of Bulgaria on the Central 
Powers: “to unite the Bulgarian nation within its historic and ethnographic 
borders” This was also the declaration of Bulgarian everlasting aim to create 
‘Greater Bulgaria’ in the Yeşilköy Treaty. 
Bulgarian foreign policy after the two Balkan wars was simple: to take 
revenge from the Balkan rivalries and recreation of the Yeşilköy state by the 
acquisition of Macedonian territories, which were in possession of Greece and 
Serbia, and the section of southern Dobruca that Romania had taken in 1913. 
Bulgaria had already been on the lookout for an opportunity to compensate its 
lost of the Balkan wars. As Ferdinand explained, “I know all the reproaches that 
can be made against me, but I won’t leave it at that!... my hour will come. I shall 
have my revenge; I shall set fire to the four corners of Europe!”276 Vassil 
Radoslavov also stated Bulgarian national aspirations, “Bulgaria cannot be 
denied its historical and ethnographic rights. It cannot exist without Macedonia, 
for which it had shed so much blood.”277
When the First World War broke out Bulgaria had no treaty assurances. 
From all sides, attempts were made to win the favor of the country. In which side 
it would take place was of great importance to the world because of Bulgaria’s 
strategic position to the Straits and Serbia. From both sides there was enthusiasm 
to offer Bulgaria the opportunity of recapturing large portions of territory lost in 
                                                 
275 Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of Balkan National States, 1804-1920 
(Seattle and London, 1986), p.288 
276 Constant, p.287 
277 Hall, Bulgaria’s Road, p.285  
 89  
the second Balkan war. Bulgarian policy during the first months of the war was 
cautious. In spite of German and Austrian encouragements to it, Bulgaria 
remained neutral. However, it was also known that Bulgarian government within 
the initiative of the Prime Minister Radoslavov was flirting with the two sides as 
long as it became clear which side probably won.278
When the war became general, Russia, after defending its new ally 
Serbia, promised ‘genuine advantages’ to Bulgaria if the latter would pursue 
Russophile policy and informed that Russia would accept any terrible in 
Macedonia caused by Bulgaria as ‘hostile act against Russia’.279 Without doubt, 
Ferdinand restated Bulgaria’s neutrality.  
About the entrance into the war, Bulgarian opinion was divided. There 
was a general desire for the acquisition of Macedonia, but the nation was not 
anxious to enter another war, because of the catastrophic casualties of the two 
Balkan wars-58,000 dead and 100,000 wounded people.280 The country was in a 
great financial need and received a German loan, providing a total of 500 million 
gold leva at the five percent interest with a repayment period of fifty years.281 
However, the sentiment of gaining Macedonia overrode. Finally, Bulgaria, 
experienced a severe defeat, believed that Austria-Hungary could protect its 
interests. It so tended to draw closer to the Habsburg Empire and thus to some 
extent to the Habsburg’s German ally.282
Even if in the governing circles there were a small voice of Russophiles, 
the logic of Bulgaria’s position and the influence of the German ruler inclined 
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Bulgaria’s government towards the Central Powers. In some respects, under the 
mask of neutrality, the Bulgarian government was in sympathy with Central 
Powers.283 However, in public opinion, there was a considerable opposition to 
fighting against Russia.284 At the outset of the war, thousands of letters and gifts 
to the value of 170,000 leva had given to the Russian legation in Sofia.285 
Moreover, during the Bulgarian decision-making process to prefer which side, 
the opposition parties of the Bulgaria came together and demanded from 
Ferdinand that the ultimate decision should be the outcome of an assembly, 
comprising all party coalitions. Lastly, they informed the king that the Bulgarian 
people would never tolerate a war against Russia.286 The best choice for Bulgaria 
was to preserve its neutrality. During the neutral period, Bulgaria wanted to wait 
and see which side was likely to win. 
Russo-Bulgarian relations on the eve of the world war had already 
soured. Nicholas II had visited Romania and the territories taken by Romania 
during the Balkan Wars and he also received commander of the Rumanian 
regiment which fought against Bulgaria in Silistra.287 The Russian support for 
Serbia and Romania was also well-known. Even, Sazanov openly addressed 
Bulgarian neutrality and not entering the war on the allied side as ‘an unfriendly 
act’.288
During the war period Austria managed to draw Bulgaria’s attention to 
the side of Central Powers. In addition, Russian commitment to Serbia was 
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another reason for Bulgaria’s sympathy on Central Powers, which meant the 
enemy of our enemy is my friend. The relations between Bulgaria and Russia 
had been strained by Russian diplomacy during the Balkan Wars. Once the 
Russian ambassador in Bulgaria, A.A. Savinsky told Ferdinand of Bulgaria that 
Bulgaria would have to demonstrate that it had deserved Russian support. 
Another time, he reminded the Bulgarians that ‘You must not forget that Russia 
has its own political tasks, which exceed all the others in importance; that is 
what the Bulgarians have so often overlooked!’289 So, it is clear that Bulgaria 
was no longer in the Russian sphere. Moreover, Russia’s support of Serbia led 
Bulgaria turn its face to Austria, which means that the enemy of our enemy is my 
friend. 
Sazonov regarded Bulgaria’s entrance into the war as a challenge to 
Russian “historical mission”.290 He was suspicious that Bulgaria had a  “historic” 
claims on Istanbul, and he was determined to block any military move that might 
jeopardize the consummation of the Russian plan. On 11 August 1914, Sazonov 
requested the Russian Minister in Sofia to make the following communication to 
the local government: 
Explain to the Bulgarian government that we expect a precise and 
immediate reply to the Russian proposal on neutrality with the 
obligation to oppose the advance of the Turks, at the present time 
any attempt at ambiguity is dangerous. 
If the Bulgars observe a benevolent neutrality with the above 
mentioned obligation we shall be in a position to assure them 
further territorial acquisitions, which will meet national ideal and 
desires. If we receive an unprecise answer we wish to make it 
clear to the Bulgarian government that Russia reserves herself the 
right to free action, a right which results from the alliance with 
Serbia, and that the responsibility for the consequences will fall 
upon the present political leaders in Bulgaria.291
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Bulgaria was unable to respond beyond declaring that Sofia would 
continue to observe strictest neutrality and secure the defense of Bulgarian 
territory.292  
However, in autumn 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered the war from the 
side of Central powers and this changed the situation for Bulgaria as the value of 
a Bulgarian alliance increased. And more importantly, the Dardanelles campaign 
of April 1915 increased the strategic importance of Bulgaria, the Central powers 
was in great need to transport the Ottoman Empire arms and ammunitions via 
Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Allies wanted Bulgaria to attack Istanbul, thus 
to open Straits in order to war supplies to Russia. The Dardanelles Campaign 
showed that any Balkan state which sided with the allies was risking its 
existence.293 In Bulgaria, Ferdinand and Radoslavov were reluctant to bind 
themselves not only to the Entente, but also to the Central Powers, before the 
outcome of the war became fairly clear.294  The allied powers could meet the 
demands of Bulgaria, sacrificing it to Macedonia and Kavala, but the question 
was how to make a bargain with Serbia and Greece in return of forgoing their 
gained territories.295
The Bulgarian debate was lively. The leaders of the opposition side were 
combined to appeal for a Balkan Alliance and more agitation against the 
government. Nikola Tsanov, the Radical leader was sure about and stated that:  
You wish to entangle Bulgaria in a war against her liberator. This 
you cannot do, for it is against our Country’s real interests and 
our secular traditions. If such an act is committed it will have the 
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most terrible consequences, for it will inevitably the definite 
destruction of Bulgaria.296  
 
Despite the pull of Slavic sentiment, the Sofia government was 
determined to enter the war to realize Greater Bulgarian dream and also 
compensate the costs of the wars before.  The war on the Ottomans was to be the 
noble chance for the Bulgarians to prove to the world that although they had 
received their freedom through foreign intervention, they deserved it.297 
Ferdinand and his consultants made up their minds that Germany should win the 
war after the defeat of the Russians. The Prime Minister, Vassil Radoslavov 
wrote to Ferdinand, “We think to-day, as we thought then, that the salvation of 
our State can only be found in a policy of intimate friendship with Austria-
Hungary”.298 So to gain Macedonia, on 6 September 1915, Bulgaria joined the 
Central Powers with a military convention. Bulgaria was now an official enemy 
of Russia. Schelking argued that the reason behind Bulgaria’s choice to ally with 
Entente Powers was Ferdinand’s personal relations with Germany: “The 
tragicomedy of the situation lay in the fact that it was through Russian 
diplomacy that Ferdinand first became a friend of German Emperor and this 
eventually led to his alliance with Germany in the Great War”.299  
Treaty with Central Powers provided German and Austrian guarantees 
for the defense of Bulgaria, and also Bulgarian assistance in the case of an attack 
by one of Bulgaria’s neighbors on Central Powers. A secret annex guaranteed 
Bulgaria whole Macedonia.300 For the third time in three years, Bulgaria entered 
into war for the hope of realization of Bulgarian national aspirations. After 
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legally joining war, Bulgarian Prime Minister, Radoslavov told that Bulgarian 
territory would be extended to wherever the Bulgarian soldier set foot.301 In the 
treaty signed with Germany and Austria, the Central powers guaranteed Bulgaria 
parts of Macedonia acquired by Serbia; the military convention also stipulated a 
joint campaign against Serbia.302 So Bulgarian army drove towards Nish and 
moved into Struma and Vardar valley to cut off the Serbs’ retreat. And at last, by 
the midst of December all of Serbia occupied. 
In August 1916, Romania decided to enter the war on the side of Entente 
powers.   It was also an opportunity for the Bulgarian side to take revenge of the 
last war, on September 1916 Bulgaria attacked the Southern Dobruca, and 
Romania had to appeal Russia for help. Immediately, additional Russian troops 
in this theatre entered the war. The battle had a historical importance, since the 
Bulgarian commanders now faced their former liberators, the same Russian army 
that had fought for Bulgarian independence of Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78.  
Only forty years after the establishment of the Bulgarian Principality, 
Russia encountered a humiliating rebuke from the nation which owed its 
existence. And yet, Bulgaria, almost from the emergence of its nation-state, had 
not remained an obedient brother of Russia: the Serbian-Bulgarian war, 
unification of Eastern Rumelia with the principality, Bulgarian national 
movements in Macedonia, election of King Ferdinand and declaration of 
independence had all proceeded without the consent of Russia. Each was a 
severe blow to Russia’s authority in Bulgaria. However it should not have come 
to that momentous point. 
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 At this juncture, imperial Russian foreign policy is also questionable. 
The duality and the futility of Russia, especially the lack of conformity of the 
agents and the ministers and also Russia’s underestimation of building process of 
Bulgarian national identity through realizing Yeşilköy Bulgaria paved the way 
for its separation from the liberator. 
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   CONCLUSION 
 After the Berlin Treaty, the Great Powers expected that Bulgarian 
principality, though under the Ottoman authority, would be a vassal of Russia. 
However, Russian domination of Bulgaria was not welcomed by the Bulgarians. 
Sofia realized that the war of 1877-78 was for the establishment of Russian rule 
in the principality, not for liberation of Russia’s Slav brothers. So, Bulgaria after 
1878 increasingly displayed ingratitude towards its liberator, not content to 
remain a strategic outpost of Russia in the Balkans.  
The irredentist foreign policy of Bulgaria after its establishment in 1878 
was mostly based on Macedonian problems and relations with Russia. Bulgaria 
endeavored for free the Bulgarians still under the Ottoman dominance and 
uniting them in a common fatherland, especially known as ‘Greater Bulgaria’. 
This Bulgarian dream had been realized in the Yeşilköy Treaty, but was split into 
pieces by the Berlin Treaty. However, it did not mean the end of the dreams: 
Bulgaria in every political step followed the Yeşilköy idea. The unification of 
Eastern Rumelia was a significant movement to satisfy the aspiration of 
Bulgarians. The Balkan war in 1912 was just a continuation in this path, in 
adding Macedonia to the Greater Bulgarian project. 
In the Eastern Rumelian crisis in particular, Bulgarian-Russian relations 
were further exacerbated by the Russian opposition to the unification. After the 
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establishment of the principality, Bulgarian nationalism was identified with 
Prince Battenberg. He also began the gradual alienation of the Bulgarians from 
its liberator. After the abdication of Battenberg due to Russian pressure, during 
the period of Stambulov Bulgaria continued loosening its bands with Russia. 
Russian interference in the internal politics of Bulgaria, as in the expulsion of 
Prince Battenberg, had angered Stambulov, too.  
After the fall of Stambulov, the relations between Russia and Bulgaria 
improved to the point where they made a secret military agreement in 1902. 
However, Bulgaria was so resolute on following its own path. In the Balkan 
Wars, Bulgaria decided to wage war independently to reach their ideal borders. 
The loss of territory in the last of these wars ensured the Bulgarians would seek 
compensation for in World War I. The resulting clash with Russian forces was 
the most momentous event in its history: Bulgaria dared to wage war against 
Russia, to whom it owed its independence. 
 After gaining its autonomy, Bulgaria’s main goal was to always win 
national borders in accordance with Yeşilköy. The Bulgarian people in this 
period, like most newly awakened nationalities, were extremely sensitive to 
foreign interference.  Sofia gave the emphasis on the development of the 
Bulgarian nationalism and construction of its own independent policy which 
could only make Russo-Bulgarian relations worse. 
The Russian factor was always important in Bulgarian politics. The 
expectations of the Russians from the Bulgarians did not always serve the 
Bulgarian national interests. Russian policy in Bulgaria aimed to preserve and 
consolidate the position of influence and control obtained in 1878. However, the 
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Bulgarian reaction to Russian interference was strong: Bulgarian nationalists 
made it clear that the gratitude of a liberated people towards its liberator did not 
mean that the former must sacrifice its liberty. Simply put, Bulgaria did not want 
to be under Russian tutelage. Russia military occupation and political 
domination in the principality was doomed to fail.  
So Russia’s aim of saving its “little brother” from the Ottoman Empire 
failed. Russia eventually saw the collapse of its entire policy in Bulgaria, as 
failing to understand the Bulgarian thirst for independence not only from the 
Ottomans but from any other power. Instead of Russian military assistance, 
Bulgaria often demanded Russia’s officials leave the country.  
Moreover, another problem of Russian Bulgarian policy was that there 
was no consistency in the attitudes of the agents appointed to Bulgaria. Further, 
they wished the Balkan states to accord to them the same degree of docile 
submission, even servility and expected the regime to appreciate their leadership 
and also follow their orders with respect and gratitude. The failure of the Russian 
policy in Bulgaria was also the same in the other small Balkan states under the 
influence of Russia’s Panslavist ideology. It was simple to think that Balkan 
states tried to receive economic and military contribution from Russia, however 
when they did not need the Russian help, they simply desired Russia to go back 
without intervening any kind of Balkan policies. We can remind here the words 
of Karavelov, a Bulgarian nationalist about Russia: “If Russia comes to liberate, 
she will be received with great sympathy, but if she comes to rule, she will find 
many enemies.” 
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 The Bulgarian case illustrates how difficult it was for the Great Powers to 
direct the small and the new-established states in the peninsula. The conditions 
were also the same for other Balkan states in their national building process. 
Russian military and diplomatic efforts made possible the widening of Serbian 
autonomy and its achievement of independence. Serbia was under the control of 
Russia till the 1813, but Russian influence and domination was weakened after 
1878 with the independence of Serbia. Romanian autonomy and then 
independence were the result of successful Russian wars. 
  Likewise, the organization of autonomous Bulgaria in 1878 came about 
after a Russian victory. The Russian campaigns of 1828-1829 created the 
situation that enabled the powers to establish an independent Greece. However, 
the attitudes of the Balkan states were quite different and did not usually result in 
gratefulness of Balkan states towards Russia. Each small state tried to establish 
its own unique policy, rather than depending on a Great Power. Each was 
insistent on demonstrating that it was not just a puppet of the Great Powers.   
The period between 1878 and 1915, nearly forty years, witnessed 
dramatic change in Bulgarian foreign policy towards Russia. After the Russo-
Ottoman war, Bulgaria gradually isolated itself from Russia’s heavy–handed 
interference. Especially after the 1880s, the situation deteriorated more. Bulgaria 
was not willing to give any sort of concessions to Russia which was in 
contradiction with its national aspirations. Relations with Russia remained 
subordinate to Bulgarian national ideals. Regardless of Russian policy, the 
unification of the Bulgarian lands was permanent in Bulgarian policy. During the 
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twentieth century, Bulgaria continued to explore all means and alliances to attain 
the dream of Yeşilköy. 
   
After the Yeşilköy Treaty, Russia expected Bulgaria’s obedience. 
However, what Russia faced was a Bulgarian monster which came back to haunt 
it with the entrance to the First World War in 1915 on the side of central powers. 
Bulgaria was the only Balkan country to ally itself with the enemies of Russia. 
Bulgaria’s greed to establish an independent state, free from Russian interference 
transformed this nation from Russia’s Slavic ally to an enemy.  
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